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AN ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AMONG BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN LISTED COMPANIES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 3
SANTRAUKA 4
INTRODUCTION 5
I. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FACTORS INFLUENCING ITS DISCLOSURE 8
1.1. Analysis of the concept and theories of corporate governance 8
1.1.1. An overview of the concept and the role of corporate governance 8
1.1.2. An overview of the main corporate governance related theories 11
1.2. Analysis of corporate governance disclosure and its regulation 14
1.2.1. An overview of legislation on corporate governance in the EU 15
1.2.2. An overview of corporate governance codes 16
1.2.3. The importance of corporate governance disclosure 18
1.3. Analysis of factors influencing corporate governance disclosure 21
1.3.1. An analysis of company related factors 22
1.3.2. An analysis of corporate governance related factors 24
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND ITS INFLUENCING FACTORS AMONG BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN LISTED COMPANIES 28
2.1. Reasoning of the need for the empirical research, its aim and object 28
2.2. The hypotheses of the empirical research 30
2.3. The empirical research data sample 33
2.4. The empirical research stages, logic, and methods 35
2.5. Limitations of the empirical research 38
III. RESEARCH RESULTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND ITS INFLUENCING FACTORS AMONG BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN LISTED COMPANIES AND DISCUSSION 40
3.1. The comparison of corporate governance codes 40
3.2. The assessment of the level of corporate governance disclosure 41
3.3. Analysis of factors influencing the level of corporate governance disclosure 49
3.4. The assessment of the research results and discussion 53
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 60
LIST OF REFERENCES 63
APPENDIXES 69

ABSTRACT

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The aim of this diploma paper is to assess the factors that influence the level of corporate governance disclosure among the companies, listed in Baltic and Scandinavian stock exchanges. The diploma paper consists of three parts. In the first part of the diploma paper the theoretical aspects of corporate governance are analyzed: the concept and the key theories of corporate governance are explained; regulation on corporate governance in the European Union is overviewed; and the importance of corporate governance disclosure and factors influencing the level of such disclosure are discussed. The second part of the diploma paper presents the methodology of the empirical research. In this part the research hypotheses are explained; the research methods, scope, and information sources are presented; and the limitations of the research are discussed. The third part of the diploma paper is dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the research results. Results of the analysis revealed that Scandinavian listed companies disclose more corporate governance information compared with Baltic listed companies. Analysis identified that company's size, board independence, large audit firms, and audit committee have a positive statistically significant influence on the level of corporate governance disclosure. Company's profitability does not have a statistically significant influence on corporate governance disclosure.

SANTRAUKA

Baigiamojo darbo autorius:	Giedrė Petrošiūtė
Pilnas baigiamojo darbo pavadinimas:	Baltijos ir Skandinavijos šalių listinguojamų įmonių korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos atskleidimo lygį lemiančių veiksnių vertinimas
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Šiame magistro darbe siekiama įvertinti veiksnius darančius poveikį korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos atskleidimo lygiui įmonėse, listinguojamose Baltijos ir Skandinavijos šalių akcijų biržose. Magistro darbas susideda iš trijų dalių. Pirmojoje darbo dalyje analizuojami teoriniai korporatyvinio valdymo aspektai: pristatoma korporatyvinio valdymo samprata ir pagrindinės korporatyvinio valdymo teorijos; apžvelgiami korporatyvinio valdymo reguliavimo aspektai Europos Sąjungoje; diskutuojama korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos atskleidimo svarba ir veiksniai darantys poveikį korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos atskleidimo lygiui. Antroji magistro darbo dalis pristato empirinio tyrimo metodologiją. Šioje dalyje pagrindžiamos išsikeltos tyrimo hipotezės, tyrimo metodai, imtis ir naudoti informacijos šaltiniai yra pristatomi; diskutuojami tyrimo ribotumai. Trečia magistro darbo dalis yra skirta tyrimo rezultatų pristatymui ir diskusijai. Tyrimo rezultatai parodė, kad Skandinavijos listinguojamos įmonės atskleidžia daugiau korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos nei Baltijos listinguojamos įmonės. Tyrimas parodė, kad įmonės dydis, valdybos nepriklausomumas, didžiojo ketverto audito įmonės ir audito komitetas turi teigiamą statistiškai reikšmingą poveikį korporatyvinio valdymo informacijos atskleidimo lygiui Baltijos ir Skandinavijos listinguojamose įmonėse. Įmonės pelningumas statistiškai reikšmingo poveikio neturi.

INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the topic. Following the recent financial crisis and corporate scandals, corporate governance has drawn the attention of regulators, policy makers, institutional investors and other shareholders. Corporate governance has received broad attention both in theory and practice in recent years and is becoming an increasingly important part of investor relations. The importance of corporate governance has been enhanced by various corporate scandals in recent years. The most know corporate governance scandals around the world are the ones of Enron, Grunding, Parmalat, Micro Strategy, Cendant, WorldCom, Satyam, Tyco, Xerox, Global Crossing, HIH, Marconi, Royal Ahold, and other (Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas, 2013; Ali 2008, 2014; Khaldoon, 2015a). These and other corporate scandals and failures contributed to mistrust of the society and increased the demand for improvements in corporate governance, transparency, and accountability. All the scandals and corporate governance failures made corporate governance disclosure compulsory in the European Union member states for listed companies since European Directive 2006/46/EC.

Sound, transparent, and better practices of corporate governance are beneficial to the company. It can increase growth in market value and return on investment or decrease the cost of capital (Brandas, 2013). The strength of a corporation's governance systems and the quality of its disclosures are becoming increasingly important because stakeholders are paying more attention to what is reported and how. Corporate governance disclosure can influence the behavior of companies and protect investors (Ali, 2014). The importance of corporate governance has been emphasized by various international organizations such as World Bank, United Nations, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Corporate Governance Network, International Institute of Internal Audit etc.

Market conditions are changing fast and companies need to be able to adapt to these market conditions quickly. As corporate governance recommendations are soft law that is explained in every country's corporate governance code these codes need to be up to date and have to be revised and improved according to the situation in the market. The research (Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas, 2013; NASDAQ OMX Baltic, 2015) shows that there are certain corporate governance problems in compliance and disclosure in Lithuanian listed companies. This indicates that Lithuanian Corporate Governance Code needs to be revised and updated.

The disclosure of corporate governance related information is essential for developing the mutual trust between managers, shareholders, customers, and other stakeholders. Therefore the disclosure of corporate governance related information can be considered as a strategic task of corporations' management. Corporate governance framework is comprised of elements such as regulation and legislation, self-regulatory arrangements, and business practices which are the result of country's certain history, traditions, and circumstances. Due to this corporate governance framework and disclosure vary from one country to the other. Therefore **the problem of the diploma paper** can be formulated as follows: what are the differences in corporate governance disclosure practices among the listed companies in Baltic and Scandinavian countries and what are the factors influencing the level of such disclosure?

The object of the diploma paper: the level of corporate governance disclosure among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies and its influencing factors.

The aim of the diploma paper is based on the analysis of scientific literature and empirical research on corporate governance to prepare the research methodology and to assess the level of corporate governance disclosure among listed companies in Baltic and Scandinavian countries and to determine the factors influencing such level of the corporate governance disclosure.

The following objectives have been formulated to reach the aim of the diploma paper:

1. To analyze theoretical aspects of corporate governance and corporate governance disclosure;
2. To identify factors influencing corporate governance disclosure;
3. To develop and provide methodology of the empirical research of corporate governance disclosure levels and factors influencing it among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies;
4. To perform and provide the results of an empirical research on corporate governance disclosure and factors influencing it among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies;
5. To summarize the results of the empirical research of corporate governance disclosure and factors influencing it among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies and to provide recommendations.

The research methods applied in this diploma paper are systemic, logical, comparative analysis of scientific literature and empirical research, content analysis, index method, graphical analysis, correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis.

Literature and information sources: Science Direct, EBSCO, SSRN, Emerald, Google Scholar databases, corporate governance codes of Scandinavian and Baltic countries, annual reports of companies, and other information sources.

Logics of the diploma paper. The diploma paper consists of three parts. In the first part of the diploma paper the concept, role, and key theories of corporate governance are analyzed in detail. The regulation of corporate governance in the European Union is overviewed and the understanding and need of corporate governance codes are explained. The importance of corporate governance disclosure is discussed. The factors that influence corporate governance disclosure level are described and their influence on corporate governance disclosure level is explained. In the second part of the diploma paper, the need for the empirical research on corporate governance disclosure and factors influencing it in Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies is explained. Research hypotheses are formulated and justified by theoretical findings. The logics and selected methods for the research are reasoned. Limitations of the research are described. In the third part of the diploma paper the results of the empirical research of corporate governance disclosure and factors influencing the level of such disclosure in Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies are presented. The factors and their influence on corporate governance disclosure are assessed. The results of the empirical research are discussed based on the comparable analysis with the results of the previous researches. At the end of the diploma paper conclusions are made, recommendations and suggestions for further research are provided.

I. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FACTORS INFLUENCING ITS DISCLOSURE

In this part of diploma paper the concept, role, and main theories of corporate governance are analyzed in detail. The understanding and need of corporate governance codes, regulation of corporate governance by legislation are explained. The importance of corporate governance disclosure is discussed. The factors influencing corporate governance disclosure are described and their influence on corporate governance disclosure is explained.

1.1. Analysis of the concept and theories of corporate governance

The narrow and broad understanding of corporate governance (CG) exists. Based on narrow view CG is understood as the relation between a company and its owners which leads to agency theory. Based on broad view CG can be understood as the relation between a company and its stakeholders which lead to stakeholders' theory. Broad view of CG not only includes CG itself but also corporate social responsibility and accountability. Based on these views various CG definitions were developed and other CG theories were founded which are analyzed further in this chapter of the diploma paper.

1.1.1. An overview of the concept and the role of corporate governance

There is no single definition of CG as it is a broad scope which involves both social and institutional aspects. There are various definitions and understandings of CG and there are many different groups that have an interest in CG. Appendix 2 provides definitions of CG according to different authors from various perspectives. The most detailed definition is provided by OECD (2015) which states that:

"CG is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The CG structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance."

As it can be seen from various definitions of CG the main idea in CG is separation between management and control while taking into account the interests of other stakeholders. In a simple manner CG can be defined as a way how the company is directed and controlled. The owners of the company elect the board of directors as their representatives. The board of directors delegate daily management of the company to the chief executive officer (CEO). While CEO is accountable to the board of directors, the board of directors is accountable to the shareholders of the company. Board of directors not only hires the CEO, it also advices, develops the strategy of the company and oversees its performance. Such system of governing the company is known as CG.

According to H.Fard, S.Fard, and H.Darvish (2015) the need for CG arises from the potential conflicts of interest among participants (stakeholders) in the corporate structure. There are two main reasons for those conflicts of interest which arise from agency theory. Firstly, owners and managers of the company have different preferences and goals. Secondly, information asymmetry exists between managers and owners. In order to avoid these conflicts of interest certain controlling activities have to be implemented. In other words CG is concerned with the control of a corporation which is vested in the board of directors whose role is to coordinate and balance the interests of different stakeholders and achieve sustainable profit (Fung, 2014).

Various stakeholders' groups focus on different aspects of CG from their point of view. For example, shareholders are more interested in value maximization of the corporation and their rights while regulators are more focused on compliance issues. Employees are interested in their employment guarantees and rights. Regardless of the definition the basic principles of CG according to B.Fung (2014) include transparency, accountability, and corporate control. Figure 1 shows CG pillars as described by BICG (2010a).

Accountability	**Fairness**	**Transparency**	**Responsibility**
• Making sure that management is accountable to the board and the board is accountable to shareholders; utilizing company's resources in the most efficient and desirable manner.	• Protecting shareholders' rights and treating all shareholders, including minority, equally.	• Ensuring timely, accurate disclosure on all material matters; ensuring that management will not engage in improper or unlawful behavior; incorporating a system of checks and balances.	• Recognizing shareholders rights and encouraging cooperation between the company and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and economic sustainability.

Figure 1. Corporate governance pillars

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with BICG (2010a).

While analyzing CG it is important to look at the objectives of it which gives the idea what can be expected from companies that follow CG mechanisms and seek better CG performance and practices in companies. OECD (2015) states that the role of CG framework is: to promote transparent and fair markets and the efficient allocation of resources. ACCA

(2009) defines three main purposes of CG:

- To ensure the board, as representatives of the organization's owners, protects resources and allocates them to make planned progress towards the organization's defined purpose;
- To ensure those governing and managing an organization account appropriately to its stakeholders;
- To ensure shareholders and, where appropriate, other stakeholders, can and do hold boards to account.

As various corporate scandals and failures happened around the world during the last few decades it is very important that CG would be an important issue for all stakeholders in the company. Good CG would not only let to avoid corporate failures, it also minimizes the risk, increases investors' trust in the company, enhances company's reputation and transparency, increases company value and company performance. According to C.Brandas (2013) good CG also includes the existence of proper environment for performance based management, focused on a mechanism that will ensure integrity and transparency in the decision-making processes and clearly setting the company objectives, the means through which these objectives are achieved, and also the methods of evaluating performance.

As P.Kousalya, D.Revathi, and T.Mohan (2013) state CG encourages a trustworthy, moral, and ethical environment. According to Karagiorgos et al. (2010) a higher quality of CG allows firms to gain access to capital markets more easily. According to A.Ngwube (2013) good CG is necessary in order to:

1. Attract investors both local and foreign and assuring them that their investments will be secure and efficiently managed in a transparent and accountable process;
2. Create competitive and efficient companies and business enterprises;
3. Enhance the accountability and performance of those entrusted to manage corporations;
4. Promote efficient and effective use of limited resources.

Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2012) concludes that appropriate CG is essential in order to attract investments from abroad and within the country, to keep investors' confidence, and enhance company's competitiveness. BICG (2010b) also agrees that adopting CG principles brings stronger ability to attract foreign investments and compete on the global market, easier access to capital and lower capital costs for well-governed companies, 10-40% premium valuation of the company, up to 0,5% lower interest rate on loans, lower risk of fraud and corporate failures, and faster and more sustainable economic growth and job creation.

To summarize, CG can be understood as a way a company is managed and controlled in a transparent, accountable, fair, and responsible manner taking into account interest of various stakeholders. Good CG practices not only reduce the risk of fraud and corporate failure, but it also increases trust in the market, and makes access to the capital easier.

1.1.2. An overview of the main corporate governance related theories

Various theoretical frameworks exist that try to analyze and explain CG. The most widely known theories of CG include agency theory, transaction cost theory, stakeholder theory, organization theory, resource dependency theory, and stewardship theory (Solomon, 2010). These theories differ from each other to some extent however they share some commonalities as well.



Figure 2. Main theories explaining corporate governance
Source: A.Al-Mamum, Q.R.Yasser, A.Rahman (2013).

Further agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and institutional theory will be analyzed in more detail. The mix of these four theories leads to effective CG and can be considered as fundamental theories of CG according to A.Al-Mamum, Q.R.Yasser, A.Rahman (2013) (Figure 2). None of the theories can provide the best performance results however according to A.Al-Mamun, Q.R.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013) mix of them can deliver the business need and keep the organization running while balancing the principal and the manager rights over the business.

Agency theory's the main idea is that owners of the company delegate daily running of the company to the management. In this theory the managers are considered to be agents, and the owners or shareholders are the principal. The theory is based on a clear separation of roles between management and ownership which lead to agency problems meaning that agents do not always act in the best interest of the principal therefore there is a conflict between goals of the agent and the principal (Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas, 2013).

In finance main objective of the company is value maximization for the shareholders however in reality agents usually prefer to fulfill their personal goals first. According to J.Solomon (2010) this can result in a tendency to focus on project and company investment that provide high short-run profits rather than the maximization of long-term shareholder wealth through investment in projects that are long-term in nature. Such behavior can be called short-termism. J.Solomon (2010) argues that short-termism attitudes due to flawed remuneration structures and excessive risk-taking have been blamed in part for the global financial crisis.

This agency problem presents shareholders the need to control management. Therefore agency costs arise from this attempt to monitor and control management. Agency costs include principal's monitoring expenditures, agent's bonding expenditures, and residual loss which are the reduction in the shareholder's welfare. The main reasons of the agency problem are considered to be different attitude to risk (Solomon, 2010) and information asymmetry (Brandas, 2013).

However, C.Ali (2014) argues that there are two types of agency conflicts: agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Type I agency conflict) and agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders (Type II agency conflict also called principal-principal conflict). C.Ali (2014) states that Type II agency conflicts negatively influence disclosure quality and there are more noticeable in family-controlled companies while Type I agency conflicts are more seen in large companies. Principal-principal conflicts usually arise due to the lack of convergence between the interest of controlling and minority shareholders.

According to agency theory chairman and chief executive officer positions should be held not by the same person in order to be able to protect shareholders' interest (Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas, 2013; Al-Mamun, Yasser, Rahman, 2013). The agency theory implies that firms exert their efforts to enhance the CG disclosure in order to reduce the agency costs and pressures from the regulatory bodies (Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli, 2013).

Stakeholder theory. Recently it was noticed that there has been a shift from the traditional shareholder-centric approach to stakeholder oriented approach in CG. As

N.Mosunova (2014) defines stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives. Therefore shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, financiers and lenders, governments, community, local charities, and various interest groups can be considered as stakeholders due to the fact that they hold some kind of stake in the company. According to J.Solomon (2010) the most extreme proponents of stakeholder theory suggest that the environment, animal species, and future generations should be included as stakeholders as well.

According to J.Solomon (2010) a basis for stakeholder theory is that companies are so large, and their impact on society so pervasive, that they should discharge accountability to many more sectors of society than solely their shareholders. Therefore corporate social responsibility is closely linked with stakeholder theory. Companies are actively encouraged to change and improve their attitude to different stakeholders and to act in a socially responsible way and satisfy the interests of those stakeholders because the ignorance of stakeholders' needs may lead to lower financial performance or corporate failure while fulfillment of them may improve shareholders' value.

The main idea behind the stakeholder theory is that all stakeholders have the right to be provided with information about how the organization is affecting them (perhaps through pollution, community sponsorship, provision of employment, safety initiatives, etc.) even if they choose not to use the information and even if they cannot directly affect the survival of the organization according to A.Al-Mamum, Q.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013). Therefore stakeholder theory is a means for the company to achieve one of the CG pillars which is transparency.

Stakeholder theory also gives organizations an incentive to disclose information about their various programs that are related to different stakeholder groups in order to be able to show that stakeholder expectations are met. According to A.Al-Mamum, Q.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013) disclosing necessary reporting to the shareholders is the duty of management and proper disclosure can build good relationships between owners and managers while at the same time reducing agency problem as stakeholder theory gives managers more resources and a greater capability to deal with companies' internal problems.

Stewardship theory was created as a substitute for the agency theory in order to solve the shortcomings of it. The main idea behind the stewardship theory is that managers act as stewards in the company and in the best interest of the owners (principals). According to A.Al-Mamum, Q.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013) stewardship can simply be defined as a behavior that places the long term interest of the organization as well as the shareholders a head of individuals' self-interest which means putting collectivist options above self-serving options. As A.Aleliūnaitė and C.Christauskas (2013) state the stewardship theory highlights not control but active participation, not monitoring but greater trust in the CEO, supported more the development of activities rather than greater control of costs. Applying stewardship theory in CG brings more benefits to the company and its shareholders as managers are honest and not selfish and use the resources of the company effectively and economically.

Stewards are trying to protect and maximize shareholders wealth due to the fact that their utility function maximizes and they will benefit if the company succeeds. As A.Al-Mamum, Q.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013) state the stewardship theory believes in acting in the best interest of the organization, unlike agency theory, therefore it argues that any control or monitoring structure may de-motivate decision makers which may have negative impact on firm performance. The main characteristic attributable to stewardship theory and such management style include open communication and trust, empowerment, long-term orientation and performance improvement. According to the stewardship theory the same person holding CEO and chairman positions is effective and can reduce agency costs while aligning the goals of managers and shareholders which lead to increase in firm performance due to no conflict of self-interest.

Institutional theory. According to this theory institutions were created with the purpose to decrease the uncertainty of transactions between economics agents while big part of the uncertainty is related to opportunistic human behavior. As A.Al-Mamum, Q.Yasser, and A.Rahman (2013) state institutional theory argues that organizations are not just a place where goods and services are produced rather these are also social and cultural systems. Pressured by institutions companies have to meet certain CG standards. One specific attribute of institutional theory is coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism arises when organizations change their institutional practices in response to pressure form stakeholders upon whom the organization is dependent (Al-Mamun, Yasser, Rahman, 2013).

To summarize, agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and institutional theories create an effective CG framework. These four theories together cover different types of stakeholders within the companies. Agency theory focus on the relationship between the management and the principal, while stakeholder theory includes social relationships with other stakeholder groups and institutional theory introduces rules, regulation, and their enforcement.

1.2. Analysis of corporate governance disclosure and its regulation

The CG framework for listed companies in the European Union is a combination of hard law (legislation) and CG codes (soft law) (ECODA, IFC, 2015). According to ECODA and IFC (2015) international bodies, such as International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been developing international standards that affect European CG practices. These two types of regulation will be analyzed further as well as the importance of CG disclosure.

1.2.1. An overview of legislation on corporate governance in the EU

According to ECODA and IFC (2015) since 2003, the European Commission (EC) has been active in developing actions plans, recommendations, and directives related to CG. EC Recommendation 2005/162/EC (2005) is concerned with the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and the committees of board. The rules of the independence of directors are laid down in the recommendation as well as with the recommendation to set up board committees to deal with audit, nomination, and remuneration issues.

EC Directive 2006/46/EC (2006) required all listed companies to produce a CG statement in their annual report to shareholders and introduced the “comply or explain” principle. This statement should cover the elements of companies’ governance structures and practices. According to ECODA (2015) this directive combined the flexibility of the self-regulatory approach of governance codes with the legal obligation of transparency (in the CG statement of the annual report) and accountability (the obligation to explain when not in compliance with the code’s recommendations). EC directive 2007/36/EC (2007) sets certain rights for shareholders in listed companies while EC directive 2004/25/EC (2004) sets minimum standards for takeover bids and aims to protect minority shareholders, employees, and other interested parties.

According to the EC (2016) remuneration for board members is a key area where managers may have a conflict of interest and account should be taken of shareholder interests. EC recommendation 2009/385/EC (2009) states that remuneration should be performance-based and promote long-term sustainability, companies should publicly disclose their remuneration policies, and shareholders should be able to influence remuneration policy. EC recommendation 2009/384/EC (2009) deals with remuneration policies in the financial services sector.

EC recommendation 2014/208/EU (2014) is on CG reporting, especially concerned with the explanations companies should provide regarding governance codes (“comply or explain”). It aims to provide guidance to listed companies, investors, and other interested parties in order to improve the overall quality of corporate governance statements and the application of the “comply or explain” concept (ECODA, 2015). EC directive 2013/50/EU (2013), which is revised transparency directive, requires issuers of securities traded on EU regulated markets to ensure appropriate transparency through a regular flow of information to the markets – e.g. disclosure of major holdings of all financial instruments that could be used to acquire economic interest in listed companies.

To summarize, Europe has become one of the fastest changing CG environments in the world (ECODA, IFC, 2015). EC’s focus on CG and its release of directives and recommendations regarding CG practices provides listed companies guidelines how to structure their CG models and regulators how the national CG codes could be improved and adjusted according to the legislation.

1.2.2. An overview of corporate governance codes

To achieve better CG various institutions and countries have issued a series of documents that regulate the CG system. These documents are usually codes and principles of good practice on CG (Brandas, 2013) which provide companies with guidelines on CG. Codes of CG help to implement the good practices of CG which are successfully applied in other countries. It is believed that one of the most effective and popular means which positively affect the CG are codes of CG. According to L.Juozaitienė and R.Mituzienė (2008) codes of CG are the instruments which aim at enhancing the culture of CG and transparency of corporations’ activities.

Codes of CG are a set of norms and rules which determine the general models of behavioral activities and general standards of relationships between various parties. As L.Juozaitienė and R.Mituzienė (2008) state codes of CG are essential when solving conflicts of interest. The main purpose of the CG codes is to determine the priorities of the relations with target groups and to choose the best harmonization methods for interest groups. The codes and the principles of good CG can take the form of a set of concepts and rules or recommendations (Brandas, 2013). Recommendations of CG codes involve areas related with protection of shareholders’ interests, appropriate distribution of monitoring and governing bodies in the corporation; it also promotes corporations to disclose information to the market appropriately.

There is no single CG code as well as CG framework around the world. However by analyzing various CG frameworks, models, and codes it is possible to find out general CG principles of good and effective practices. The foundation of CG codes is related with business reaction to ongoing changes in practices of corporations and new opportunities which cannot be always implemented by law as it would reduce the dynamics and effectiveness of the business. Founded codes of CG increase attention of society to CG problems and helps to understand the expectations related to governing bodies of corporations.

The recommendations of CG codes are considered as soft law while legislation is hard law. Soft law is regarded to be more flexible and it reflects to best practice meanwhile hard law provides the minimum standard that forms the framework for company conduct according to Committee on Corporate Governance (2014). Soft law is more dynamic than traditional legislation as it is more easily adapted to the developments within the areas affected which enables the recommendations remain continuously up-to-date (Committee on Corporate Governance, 2014). The flexibility is very important in CG as not every recommendation can be applied to all companies.

Most of the CG codes are based on “comply or explain” approach which is a key element of CG recommendations and according to ECODA (2015) has become a feature of Europe’s approach to CG. This means that companies’ are not obligated to comply with every rule or recommendation in the CG code and are allowed to choose alternative solutions which might be better in certain circumstances. If the company does not fully comply with the code of CG and deviates from the requirements, it must provide justifications and reasons for such deviations from CG code and explain alternative solutions for specific deviations.

“Comply or explain” approach gives the company more flexibility in the application of CG code. The company may depart from an individual recommendation of the CG code due to, e.g. the ownership or company structure or the special characteristics of its area of business (Securities Market Association, 2010). The main reason why “comply or explain” approach was put in place is that it allows to avoid inflexible one size fits all approach. However United Nations (2011) argues that its practical application can lead to complexities and confusion when combined with voluntary codes and overly generalized requirements. The importance and need of CG codes is not questionable and according to FRC (2011) the key benefits of CG codes include:

- *Codes are effective in changing the behavior*. FRC (2011) argues that once a code is well established and respected, changes then can be made quickly and also lead to rapid compliance.
- *Codes are adaptive to the needs of companies*. As the codes are issued based on comply of explain approach, this provides companies with flexibility.

- *Codes can be more effective at raising standards than law*. Codes are flexible and can be tailored to different contexts; standards can be higher than those set out in law, which need to be consistent and applied to all companies involved (FRC, 2011).
- *Codes evolve easily over time in response to changing economic circumstances*. FRC (2011) argues that codes can be used to react quickly to developments, emergence of new products, new information asymmetries and advances in governance practices as codes can be redrafted and implemented without legislative change.
- *Codes reduce the risk of moral hazard*. Codes can help to avoid moral hazard as investors will look to the CG metrics of companies and use this as part of their investment decision (FRC, 2011).
- *Codes help standards of CG converge between countries*. Shareholders activity at international level can act as a converging force on the quality of CG as countries seeking international investment adopt what those investors see as best practice (FRC, 2011).
- *Codes encourage innovation*. Codes provide flexibility for companies to justify why they have not met a specific provision by providing an explanation which can take the form of an alternative approach. This approach encourages innovation in governance practices in a way which is adaptive and may develop best practice further.
- *Codes are less costly than law*. Codes can be less costly than a rule based system. Companies have the incentive to assess the relative costs and benefits of standards through the flexibility of codes.

To summarize, CG codes encourage best practice in CG and change behavior. The good CG presented in CG codes strengthens confidence and trust in companies, and help to ensure the greatest possible value creation over time in the best interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders.

1.2.3. The importance of corporate governance disclosure

The disclosure of CG related information is important due to the fact that such information is essential for shareholders for informed decision making, potential investors while making their investment decisions, the various stakeholders in order to be able to see how their needs and expectations are met, and regulators to maintain market confidence and stability. The essential elements of CG framework can be regarded as transparency and disclosure. In order for CG related information to be useful it has to meet certain characteristics. CG disclosure should be concise, clear, precise, and governed by the substance over form principle. According to B.Fung (2014) there are five qualitative characteristics of CG that lead to transparent CG disclosure (Figure 3).

Truthfulness	**Completeness**	**Materiality of information**	**Timeliness**	**Accessibility**
• Information disclosed must provide accurate description of circumstances.	• Information disclosed, both financial and non-financial, must be sufficient to enable investors to make informed decisions.	• Information disclosed must be material to influence investment decisions.	• Information disclosed must be timely to enable investors to react as quickly as possible.	• Information disclosed must be easily accessible and available to investors at low cost.

Figure 3. Qualitative characteristics of corporate governance disclosure
Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with B.Fung (2014).

While disclosing CG information companies might be afraid to disclose too much information however companies are not expected to disclose information that could endanger company's competitive position unless such disclosure is essential for investment decision making and avoiding misleading investors therefore disclosed information should be material. While disclosing CG information companies meet certain costs which should not be unreasonable according to B.Fung (2014) and costs and harm of disclosure should be lower than the benefit gained by such disclosure. The main costs of CG disclosure include (Maingot, Zeghal, 2008):

- *Economic costs* – managers will only disclose information if the advantages of such disclosure exceed the cost of disclosing the information;
- *The effect of disclosure on competition* – divulging sensitive information to the public decreases competitive edge of a corporation therefore the higher the competitiveness in the market, the higher cost of disclosure.
- *Legal costs* – these costs are related with the non-disclosure of information which will trigger legal penalties and the corporation will have to restate its disclosed information to reflect this new information which will increase the overall cost of disclosure.
- *Political costs* – the political environment of the corporation affects its level of disclosure. A corporation with high visibility of the political spectrum will wish to diminish its level of disclosure to avoid the interest of the government.

CG disclosure is beneficial both for the company and the whole market therefore the advantages of good and strong CG disclosure will be explained. Disclosure of good CG practices benefits companies, investors, and markets. According to A.G.Khaldoon (2015a) a strong disclosure regime enhances transparency, and it is a powerful tool for influencing the behavior of stakeholders and protecting investors. B.Fung (2014) adds that greater extent of transparency and disclosure increases the level of confidence in the operation of markets and the greater is the access to capital financing which according to OECD (2015) is essential for future oriented growth companies and to balance any increase in leveraging. Strong CG disclosure is a sign of strength in a company which can reduce risk. Disclosure can have a positive effect on obtaining capital and enhancing company's reputation. It also contributes to efficient and liquid markets as investors can make their decisions based on all available information.

Better CG disclosure and transparency also contribute to the reduction of the information asymmetry which mitigates agency problem and reduces agency costs which are widely discussed in agency theory and regarded as the main problem. According to B.Fung (2014) reducing the information asymmetry by more voluntary financial disclosures on the stock market increases share liquidity and reduces equity cost of capital. Strong CG disclosure can help attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital markets. There is a positive relationship between disclosing information to investors and stock prices according to M.Maingot and D.Zeghal (2008).

J.Ramli, K.Surbaini, and M.Ramli (2013) also argues that increased CG disclosure can help companies to reduce the cost of capital, raise capital at the lowest cost, and reduce the cost of debt capital. OECD (2015) research shows that companies with a good CG record are often able to borrow larger sums and on more favorable terms compared with the companies with poor disclosure or which operate in less transparent markets. OECD (2015) CG principles indicate that CG disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies' relationships with the communities in which they operate.

United Nations (2011) discusses that strong CG disclosure has the potential to increase efficiency in companies and encourage innovation. United Nations (2011) also states that disclosure is important because reporting is widely viewed as the most effective tool that regulators have to encourage better CG. Strong disclosure and transparency can also lead to better CG practices. Strong CG disclosure can also increase company's valuation. BICG (2010b) states that valuation premium for the company can be 10-40%. CG disclosure also helps to get acquainted with the company's activities, policies, and performance related with ethical and environmental standards and the relationship with different stakeholders. H.Horak and K.Dumančic (2013) also state that relevant and reliable CG disclosure attracts institutional investors and increases company's ownership by them.

As strong CG disclosure provides certain advantages, poor CG disclosure creates certain problems and disadvantages. First of all, poor CG disclosure and transparency is viewed as risky. B.Fung (2014) and OECD (2015) also add that weak disclosure and non-transparent practices can contribute to unethical behavior and a loss of market integrity at great cost, not just to the company and its shareholders but also to the economy as a whole. According to A.Khaldoon (2015a) and OECD (2015) insufficient or unclear information may hamper the ability of the markets to function, increase the cost of capital, and result in poor allocation of resources.

H.Horak and K.Dumančic (2013) research revealed that the financial crisis has shown how non-transparent operations under weak CG can affect not only the company itself but the entire economy, even on the global level. Therefore improvement in transparency is needed in a way that companies provide better and more exhaustive information about their CG practices to the stakeholders. H.Horak and K.Dumančic (2013) indicate that companies that fail to disclose information adequately would find it difficult to maintain listing on the stock market or to attract investors.

To summarize, greater transparency in disclosure is necessary for effective financial reporting and supervision as well as effectively functioning capital market. Transparency in disclosure helps to deter and prevent frauds, avoid financial scandals, corruption and to enhance allocation of resources. Sound CG disclosure practices also differentiate firms from the ones with poor CG disclosure. Strong corporate governance disclosure can increase external financing, investment, growth, and employment creation.

1.3. Analysis of factors influencing corporate governance disclosure

This part of the diploma paper examines the combined set of CG features that influence CG disclosure. These features include both CG attributes and firm characteristics as seen in Figure 4. In the academic literature there are various factors considered that has an impact on CG disclosure. Among the company related factors there are company's size and profitability, liquidity, and company age. CG related factors include board size and independence, ownership concentration and ownership of institutional investors, CEO task's duality, audit committee, large audit firms, etc. Various researchers (Ali, 2008, 2014; Khaldoon, 2015a, 2015b; Anderson, Daoud, 2005; Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli, 2013; Al-Moataz, Hussainey, 2012) have examined if these factors have influence on the CG disclosure and in which way.



Figure 4. Factors influencing the level of corporate governance disclosure
Reference. Compiled by author.

1.3.1. An analysis of company related factors

Company's size. It is believed that bigger companies disclose more CG related information compared with small companies. The main reason behind this is that bigger companies experience more pressure from governmental organizations and the demand required by various analysts and stakeholders is bigger. Larger corporations also receive more attention from the public which give them incentive to disclose more information as it might enhance their image and reputation.

According to M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) larger corporations are more likely to disclose more information than smaller corporations, since it is more probable that smaller corporations feel it will give the corporation competitive disadvantage when disclosing full information in the annual report. The authors (Andersson, Daoud, 2005) also argue that larger corporations will disclose more information since they need more external funds as disclosure helps to decrease the agency costs and reduce the information asymmetry between the management and the providers of funds.

Another reason why larger companies disclose more CG information arises from agency theory. According to agency theory agency costs are higher for large-sized firms because shareholders are widespread agency costs increase with the increase in outside capital which is usually higher in large companies. As A.Khaldoon (2015b) states it is reasonable to speculate that large companies are more likely to provide more information in an attempt to reduce their agency costs. J.Ramli, K.Surbaini, and M.Ramli (2013) also add that larger firms tend to disclose more information since their ability to have adequate resources to bear information dissemination costs most often at higher cost and the transparency of disclosure is perceived as a way to regain the investors' confidence to improve the market capital's efficiency.

As a proxy for measuring size of the companies most of the studies (Maingot, Zeghal, 2008; Ali, 2008, 2014; Khaldoon, 2015a, 2015b; Al-Moataz, Hussainey, 2013) used the size of companies' assets. M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) used companies' sales to measure its size and J.Ramli, K.Surbaini, M.Ramli (2013) used company's market capitalization for measuring company's size.

Company's profitability. It is believed that positive relationship exists between company's profitability and CG disclosure. According to E.Al-Moataz and K.Hussainey (2012) corporate managers of highly profitable companies are more likely to report more information to increase investors' confidence and to raise capital at the lowest cost. E.Al-Moataz, K.Hussainey (2012) and A.Khaldoon (2015b) measured the profitability of the company by the coefficient of return on total assets (ROA) which was found to be statistically significant and positively affecting CG disclosure. Agency theory suggests that managers of high profitability companies are encouraged to disclose more CG information in order to justify and increase their compensation, to show and explain to shareholders that they are acting in company's and their best interest. Therefore profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information about CG practices.

Liquidity. It is believed that companies will disclose more information if their liquidity ratio is high. To measure liquidity E.Al-Moataz and K.Hussainey (2012) used current ration. The authors (Al-Moataz, Hussainey, 2012) hypothesized that companies with high liquidity ratio need to distinguish themselves form the ones with low liquidity ratios. In order to be able to do that companies increase their CG disclosure. However agency theory contradicts this notion. According to the agency theory companies with low liquidity ratio will disclose more information in order to satisfy the demand of shareholders and creditors and reduce the conflict between them. Despite this E.Al-Moataz and K.Hussainey (2012) found liquidity as positively and statistically significantly affecting CG disclosure.

Company age. Firm size has not been very widely researched in the academic field. However it is believed that companies which are older are likely to disclose more CG information compared with the younger companies. The reason behind this is that young companies are more sensitive to competition therefore they do not disclose full information about their position and financial results. Old companies, according to A.Khaldoon (2015b), are less likely to be motivated to withhold such information since their competitive advantages cannot be easily challenged with increased disclosure. A.Khaldoon (2015b) in his research found a significant positive relationship between firm age and the level of CG disclosure.

1.3.2. An analysis of corporate governance related factors

Board size. There are different opinions about the effect of the size of the board on CG disclosure. Some authors (Ali, 2008, 2014; Khaldoon, 2015a) suggest that bigger board of directors increase levels of CG disclosure, while others (Andersson, Daoud, 2005) believe that bigger size of the board of directors lead to decrease in CG disclosure. C.Ali (2008, 2014) justifies his opinion suggesting that the board's monitoring capacities increase as the number of members on the board increases. A.Khaldoon (2015a) adds that larger boards are more efficient since they have a wide range of collective experience and expertise that may assist in making better decisions therefore a larger number of directors on the board can lower the likelihood of information asymmetry. While M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) argue that board of directors are less effective monitors as they grow in size due to reduced control over management. According to M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) a small board of directors will more likely take responsibility for monitoring a corporation's operations than a larger board of directors.

Independent directors. Bigger proportion of independent directors on the board of directors increases CG disclosure due to the fact that, as M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) state, non-executive independent directors strengthen the extent to which a board of directors is independent of the management and increases the effectiveness and monitoring of the board. The proportion of independent directors is usually evaluated by dividing the number of independent directors with the total number of directors on the board. J.Solomon (2010) also agrees that boards of directors with a larger proportion of independent, non-executive directors are positively and significantly related to higher levels of disclosure which results in greater transparency. As independent directors are outside of the company, they have less incentive to withhold CG related information within the company.

Monitoring of corporate boards by independent directors suggests that corporate boards will become more responsive to investors, and inclusion of independent directors on boards will improve the firm's compliance with the disclosure requirements which in turn will enhance the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosures (Ali, 2008). As C.Ali (2008) states outside directors also have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control.

According to A.Khaldoon (2015a) if independent directors on the board actually conduct their controlling and monitoring role, good CG is strengthened, board's effectiveness is enhanced, disclosure quality is improved and more information disclosure is expected. However, A.Khaldoon (2015a) and E.Al-Moataz, K.Hussainey (2012) found a negative relationship between CG disclosure and independent directors.

CEO duality. In CG two types of leadership structure exist: combined and separated structure. The situation when the CEO is also the chairman of the board is regarded as combined structure or role/CEO duality. Role duality has been found to be associated with poor CG disclosure (Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli, 2013; Ali, 2008). Companies with role duality are considered to be more managerially dominated. Therefore it is believed that in such situation where one individual holds the role of the chairman and CEO will have an incentive to withhold unfavorable information and CEO duality is negatively related with CG disclosure. M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) also add that when there is role duality in the company, the effectiveness of the board of directors can be compromised in performing its monitoring functions. Therefore it can be reasoned that it is better when different individuals hold the positions of CEO and chairman and do not compromise the effectiveness and controlling activities of the board.

Ownership structure. CG disclosure is likely to be greater in widely held firms as suggested by C.Ali (2008). In such way principals can effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimized and agents can signal that they act in the best interests of the owners. In companies with widely held ownership, the chances of conflicts between principals and agents are bigger compared with closely held firms. Greater extent of CG disclosure can help to reduce those conflicts of interest. According to C.Ali (2008) ownership dispersion increases outsiders' information demand and CG disclosure. The bigger number of shareholders can be associated with different needs of information which can also be an incentive for the company to disclose more CG related information.

In family controlled firm the ownership structure is more concentrated and usually family members actively participate in management of the firm based on private confidential inside information. According C.Ali (2014) family firms need less external financing, therefore the demand of external information is low and family firms have fewer incentives to disclose information. Therefore it is believed that family-controlled firms disclose CG related information poorly.

Institutional investors are another important part of company's ownership structure. It is believed that institutional investors are a driving force of CG disclosure as they constrain managers to respect CG practices and to improve transparency according to C.Ali (2008). Institutional investors usually hold a big part of company's shares therefore their CG related information needs are taken into account when disclosing information. Institutional ownership leads to higher extent of CG disclosure. The main reasons for that include (Ali, 2008):

1) institutional investors might be attracted to firms with good disclosure quality because such disclosure could reduce the price impact of trades;
2) good disclosure may influence the potential for profitable trading opportunities which raises the interest of institutional investors;
3) institutions that are active in CG could prefer firms with informative disclosure if they rely on public disclosure or they do not have enough resources to engage in private information.

Large audit firms. Several researchers (Andersson, Daoud, 2005; Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli, 2013) have related CG disclosure with large audit firms. The Big-Four audit firms (Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst&Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) can be considered as large audit firms. It is considered that these firms have more credibility, experience and expertise and are able to reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders by encouraging corporations to disclose more CG information. These audit firms are less likely to have a bonding relationship with their clients therefore it is expected that they require more detailed CG disclosure from their clients. The Big-Four audit firms do not also want to be associated with the clients who disclose poor and limited CG information which can damage their reputation.

Audit committee. The existence of the audit committee in the company is associated with higher CG disclosure levels. As M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) states the existence of an audit committee may improve internal control system and is regarded as an effective monitoring device for reducing managerial opportunism and improving disclosure quality. A.Khaldoon (2015a) suggests that the audit committee is an effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the quality of corporate disclosure and reduce agency costs. The author (Khaldoon, 2015a) also states that the existence of an audit committee significantly influences the amount of CG disclosure. A.Khaldoon (2015a) and E.Al-Moataz, K.Hussainey (2012) with their research found a positive and statistically significant relationship between audit committee and CG disclosure.

To conclude Table 1 summarizes the factors influencing CG disclosure. As it can be seen from Table 1 there are more factors positively influencing CG disclosure compared with factors having negative effect. Size of the company, profitability, liquidity, firm age, institutional investors, non-executive directors, large audit firms, audit committee, number of shareholders, independent directors, and dispersed ownership structure have a positive effect on CG disclosure which means that the existence and enhancement of these factors increase CG disclosure. While CEO duality, family controlled firms, concentrated ownership structure, and board size negatively affect CG disclosure. According to C.Ali (2008) adoption of internal control devices such as outside directors, separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer, enhance monitoring quality and reduce benefits from withholding information which results in disclosure quality improvement.

Table 1. Factors influencing corporate governance disclosure

Influence on CG disclosure	Factors
Positive	Size of the company, profitability, liquidity, firm age, institutional investors, non-executive directors, large audit firms, audit committee, number of shareholders, independent directors, dispersed ownership structure.
Negative	CEO duality, family controlled firms, concentrated ownership structure, board size.

Reference. Compiled by author.

To summarize, there are many factors that influence CG disclosure. The company with long history, bigger in size, more profitable, and liquid, is expected to disclose more CG related information. The existence of audit committee and Big-Four audit firms may also enhance CG disclosure. Bigger number of independent directors on the board of directors should encourage better CG reporting. However CEO duality is associated with poor CG disclosure as the opportunistic behavior may encourage CEO/chairman to withhold unfavorable information within the company.

Theoretical analysis of CG revealed the understanding of CG, the importance of its disclosure and the ways how it is regulated. The factors influencing CG disclosure have been analyzed from the theoretical point of view. Theoretical analysis of CG showed that both company related and CG related factors influence the level of CG disclosure. Based on these theoretical findings, further the research methodology will be developed and explained in the next chapter.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND ITS INFLUENCING FACTORS AMONG BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN LISTED COMPANIES

In this part of diploma paper the need for the empirical research on CG disclosure and factors influencing it among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies are explained. Research hypotheses are formulated and justified by theoretical findings. The research sample is justified. The logics and selected methods for the research are reasoned. Limitations of the research are described.

2.1. Reasoning of the need for the empirical research, its aim and object

As the research of A.Aleliūnaitė and C.Christauskas (2013) shows Lithuanian listed companies do not pay sufficient attention to full disclosure about the CG in the reports about how they complied with the recommendations of Lithuanian CG Code. The earlier research performed by Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2012) also revealed that none of the listed companies in Lithuania fully comply with the Lithuanian CG Code. Although, the compliance with Lithuanian CG Code and disclosure is increasing, not all the listed companies apply “comply or explain” approach according to Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2012).

This indicates an important problem in CG in Lithuania. Therefore it can be argued that Lithuanian CG Code needs to be updated in order to be able take these issues into the consideration and improve the situation of compliance and disclosure among Lithuanian listed companies. The latest version of Lithuanian CG Code was issued in 2010. However codes of CG have to be revised and renewed constantly according to the changes in the business practices. OECD (2015) states that as new experiences accrue and business circumstances change, the different provisions of the CG framework should be reviewed, and when necessary adjusted. Over the years European countries have revised and updated their CG codes. According to ECODA (2015) the main reasons for revising the codes include:

- To (better) converge with European and international standards;
- To take into account legal and/or regulatory change at the national level;
- To cope with new challenges and market conditions facing listed companies;
- To take into consideration the lessons learned (and comments received) in applying the recommendations in practice;
- To respond to special demands from stakeholders and society at large (especially after

the recent financial crisis).

While updating and revising national CG codes issuers of them are usually looking to other countries' experience, other countries and other international codes of best practices. ECODA (2015) research indicates that there are 17 countries in European Union planning to revise and update their CG codes. ECODA (2015) research also found out that only 15 European Union countries analyze the content of CG disclosure while in other countries the monitoring is only limited to checking whether information is available without deep analysis of content. This also indicates why CG disclosure should be analyzed in more detail. According to ECODA (2015) the promotion of high quality explanations is a critical success factor for an effective self-regulatory regime.

The above mentioned reasons clearly indicate the need of research on CG disclosure in Lithuanian listed companies. Such research would indicate the current CG disclosure problems as the latest research on CG disclosure was performed in 2013 by A.Aleliūnaitė and C.Christauskas and NASDAQ OMX Baltic in 2015. However these researches are more focused on CG practices by listed Lithuanian companies and not disclosure itself. The comparison of other countries' CG practices would provide some suggestions what can be adapted from other countries' CG disclosure practices and what can be improved in Lithuanian CG Code.

There are over 100 codes of CG issued by international organizations, associations of investors, and various countries. As L.Juozaitienė and R.Mituzienė (2008) states that CG codes of USA, United Kingdom, and Canada are considered to be the best examples. However for this research CG codes and CG disclosure practices of Scandinavian countries is chosen. It can be justified by the fact that the Scandinavian countries are renowned for a generally high degree of transparency in most aspects of societal life, including corporate governance of listed companies (Lekvall, 2014). P.Lekvall (2014) concludes that Scandinavian countries are important and currently upheld as a model for good CG around the world. In the Scandinavian, CG codes are viewed as tools for on-going improvement of CG practices by setting higher standards than the minimum levels required by law (Lekvall, 2014).

DCGC et al. (2009) state that the CG of the Scandinavian countries closely resembles that of most of the industrialized world and meets with the highest international standards and a high degree of transparency has for many years been standard procedure in Scandinavian CG. DCGC et al. (2009) also indicate that the Scandinavian companies are all highly up-to-date and include several aspects of modern CG. A study by the European

Commission (DCGC et al., 2009) ranked the Scandinavian member states among the top countries in all aspects of disclosure of information analyzed. Scandinavian listed companies have in general been early to adopt high standards of transparency towards their shareholders, the capital market and the surrounding society as a key aspect of modern CG (DCGC et al., 2009).

The object of the research: the level of CG disclosure among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies and its influencing factors.

The aim of the research is to determine the amount of CG information disclosed by listed companies in Scandinavian and Baltic countries and assess factors influencing the differences in the level of CG disclosure.

The specific objectives of the research are:

1. To measure the level of CG disclosure in Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies by CG disclosure index;
2. To compare CG disclosure between Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies;
3. To examine the relationship between various factors influencing CG disclosure and CG level of Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies;
4. To provide recommendations for the revision of Lithuanian CG Code based on the research results.

2.2. The hypotheses of the empirical research

Based on theoretical analysis six hypotheses were formulated in order to be able to evaluate factors that influence CG disclosure. The formulated hypotheses are related with company specific and CG related factors such as company size, profitability, independent directors, large audit firms, and audit committee. As it was mentioned earlier Lithuanian listed companies do not fully comply with Lithuanian CG Code and do not provide all the necessary explanations. However, Scandinavian listed companies are highly up-to-date in the CG disclosure and transparency. As stated by DCGC et al. (2009) a study by the European Commission ranked the Scandinavian member states among the top countries in all aspects of disclosure of information analyzed. Therefore it is expected that listed companies on the Scandinavian stock exchanges disclose more CG related information and the following hypothesis is formulated:

H_1**:** *Listed companies on the Scandinavian stock exchanges disclose significantly higher amount of CG related information.*

It is believed that bigger companies disclose more CG related information compared with small companies. The main reason behind this is that bigger companies experience more pressure from governmental organizations and the demand required by various analysts and stakeholders is bigger. Larger corporations also receive more attention from the public which give them incentive to disclose more information as it might enhance their image and reputation. According to M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) larger corporations are more likely to disclose more information than smaller corporations, since it is more probable that smaller corporations feel it will give the corporation competitive disadvantage when disclosing full information in the annual report. The authors (Andersson, Daoud, 2005) also argue that larger corporations will disclose more information since they need more external funds as disclosure helps to decrease the agency costs and reduce the information asymmetry between the management and the providers of funds. Therefore the following hypothesis is formulated:

H*$_2$*: There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's size and the level of CG disclosure.

It is believed that positive relationship exists between company's profitability and CG disclosure. According to E.Al-Moataz and K.Hussainey (2012) corporate managers of highly profitable companies are more likely to report more information to increase investors' confidence and to raise capital at the lowest cost. E.Al-Moataz and K.Hussainey (2012) and A.G.Khaldoon (2015b) measured the profitability of the company by the coefficient of return on total assets (ROA) which was found to be statistically significant and positively affecting CG disclosure. Agency theory suggests that managers of high profitability companies are encouraged to disclose more CG information in order to justify an increase in their compensation, to show and explain to shareholders that they are acting in company's and their best interest. Therefore profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information about CG practices and the following hypothesis is formulated:

H*$_3$*: There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's profitability and the level of CG disclosure.

Bigger proportion of independent directors on the board of directors increases CG disclosure due to the fact that, as M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) state, non-executive independent directors strengthen the extent to which a board of directors is independent of the management and increases the effectiveness and monitoring of the board. J.Solomon (2010) also agrees that boards of directors with a larger proportion of independent, non-executive directors are positively and significantly related to higher levels of disclosure which results in greater transparency. As independent directors are outside of the company, they have less incentive to withhold CG related information within the company. As C.Ali (2008) states outside directors also have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control. According to A.Khaldoon (2015a) if independent directors on the board actually conduct their controlling and monitoring role, good CG is strengthened, board's effectiveness is enhanced, disclosure quality is improved and more information disclosure is expected. Therefore the following hypothesis is formulated:

***H_4**: There is a positive statistically significant relationship between independence of the board and the level of CG disclosure.*

Several researchers (Andersson, Daoud, 2005; Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli, 2013) have related CG disclosure with large audit firms. The Big-Four audit firms (Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst&Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) can be considered as large audit firms. It is considered that these firms have more credibility, experience and expertise and are able to reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders by encouraging corporations to disclose more CG information. These audit firms are less likely to have a bonding relationship with their clients therefore it is expected that they require more detailed CG disclosure from their clients. The Big-Four audit firms do not also want to be associated with the clients who disclose poor and limited CG information which can damage their reputation. Therefore the following hypothesis is formulated:

***H_5**: There is a positive statistically significant relationship between audit by large audit firms and the level of CG disclosure.*

The existence of the audit committee in the company is associated with higher CG disclosure levels. As M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) states the existence of an audit committee may improve internal control system and is regarded as an effective monitoring device for reducing managerial opportunism and improving disclosure quality. A.Khaldoon (2015a) suggests that the audit committee is an effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the quality of CG and reduce agency costs. The author (Khaldoon, 2015a) also states that the existence of an audit committee significantly influences the amount of CG disclosure. Therefore the following hypothesis is formulated:

***H_6**: There is a positive statistically significant relationship between the existence of an audit committee and the level of CG disclosure.*

These formulated hypotheses will be accepted or rejected in the presentation of the results part. Hypothesis H_1 can be accepted/rejected based on the comparative analysis between the CG disclosure index in Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. The other hypotheses will be accepted on the basis of the results of the multiple regression model as it will be explained further in this chapter.

2.3. The empirical research data sample

As mentioned earlier the research is focused on CG disclosure among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies therefore the research sample consists of listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies. To calculate the minimum research sample size M.Saunders, P.Lewis, and A.Thornhill (2009) suggests using the following formula:

$$n = p\% \cdot q\% \cdot \left(\frac{z}{e\%}\right)^2 = 50\% \cdot 50\% \cdot \left(\frac{1.96}{5\%}\right)^2 = 384\text{, where:} \qquad (1)$$

n is the minimum sample size required

p% is the proportion belonging to the specified category

q% is the proportion not belonging to the specified category

z is the *z* value corresponding to the level of confidence required (if the level of confidence is 95% certain, then *z* value is equal to 1.96)

e% is the margin of error required.

When the total population is less than 10000, a smaller sample size can be used without affecting the accuracy which is called the adjusted minimum sample size and can be calculated using the following formula (Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, 2009):

$$n' = \frac{n}{1+\left(\frac{n}{N}\right)} = \frac{384}{1+\left(\frac{384}{888}\right)} = 268\text{, where:} \qquad (2)$$

n' is the adjusted minimum sample size

n is the minimum sample size

N is the total population.

Putting all the required numbers into the formulas (1) and (2) provides 268 to be the final needed minimum sample size of this research. The sample is selected from firms listed on Lithuania's, Latvia's, Estonia's, Finland's, Sweden's, Norway's, Denmark's, and Iceland's stock exchanges in 2014. Table 2 summarizes the information on the number of listed companies from each country included in the research.

The number of companies included in the research from each country was determined based on each country's proportion in whole number of listed companies in Baltic and Scandinavian countries. For example, there are 190 listed companies in Norway and 888 listed companies in Baltic and Scandinavian countries. The proportion of Norway's listed companies among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies is equal to 21,4% therefore 22%

of Norway's listed companies are included in the research. The same logic is applied to all other countries. Due to the fact that Iceland's and Baltic's stock exchanges are smaller, therefore more listed companies are selected from these stock exchanges.

Table 2. Number of listed companies included in the sample of the research

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Country</th><th colspan="2">Stock Exchange</th><th colspan="2">Number of listed companies</th><th>Percentage of listed companies included in the research</th><th colspan="2">Number of listed companies included in the research</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Baltic states</td><td>Lithuania</td><td rowspan="3">NASDAQ OMX Baltic</td><td>NASDAQ OMX Vilnius</td><td rowspan="3">69</td><td>29</td><td rowspan="3">75%</td><td rowspan="3">54</td><td>22</td></tr>
<tr><td>Latvia</td><td>NASDAQ OMX Riga</td><td>25</td><td>20</td></tr>
<tr><td>Estonia</td><td>NADAQ OMX Tallinn</td><td>15</td><td>12</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Finland</td><td colspan="2">NASDAQ OMX Helsinki</td><td colspan="2">137</td><td>22%</td><td colspan="2">32</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Sweden</td><td colspan="2">NASDAQ OMX Stockholm</td><td colspan="2">322</td><td>30%</td><td colspan="2">100</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Norway</td><td colspan="2">Oslo Børs and Oslo Axess</td><td colspan="2">190</td><td>22%</td><td colspan="2">40</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Denmark</td><td colspan="2">NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen</td><td colspan="2">153</td><td>22%</td><td colspan="2">35</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Iceland</td><td colspan="2">NASDAQ OMX Iceland</td><td colspan="2">17</td><td>75%</td><td colspan="2">7</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Total:</td><td colspan="2">888</td><td>30%</td><td colspan="2">268</td></tr>
</table>

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with NASDAQ OMX Nordic (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e), Oslo Børs, Oslo Axess (2016).

To be included in the sample, listed firms must satisfy certain selection criteria. First of all, companies have to be listed on selected stock exchanges in 2014. Second of all, their annual reports have to be available for 2014. Finally, the listed companies have to publish their annual report in English. Following C.Ali (2008), A.Khaldoon (2015a), M.Andersson, M.Daoud (2005) financial and insurance companies are eliminated because of their specific disclosure requirement and financial characteristics. Certain companies were excluded from the sample because of lack of data. A detailed list of the companies included in the sample of the research is reported in the Appendix 3.



Figure 5. The number and percentage of companies from each sector

Reference. Compiled by author.

Figure 5 provides information on the number and the percentage of companies from each sector that was included in the research. The majority of companies are from the industrials and the consumer goods sectors. There are few companies from telecommunications, utilities, and oil & gas sectors. Companies from each sector were also selected proportionately.

2.4. The empirical research stages, logic, and methods

Before conducting an empirical research it is necessary to develop a research plan. Figure 6 represents the sequence and the stages of this empirical research. The research period and data analyzed are determined during the preparatory stage. During the preparatory stage data is also collected and systemized.

1 **The comparison of CG codes**
- The development of the CG disclosure list
- Methods used: content analysis; comparative analysis

2 **Assessment of the level of CG disclosure**
- Calculation of CG disclosure index
- Hypothesis tested: H_1
- Methods used: content analysis; comparative analysis; index method

3 **Assessment of factors influencing CG disclosure**
- The analysis of factors influencing CG disclosure
- Hypotheses tested: H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5, H_6
- Methods used: correlation analysis; multiple regression method

4 **Evaluation of the research results**
- Explanation and discussion of the research results and comparison with other researches
- Method used: comparative analysis

Figure 6. Empirical research stages

Reference. Compiled by author.

As seen in Figure 6 the research consists of 4 stages. During the first stage of the research CG codes of selected countries are compared and the CG disclosure list developed. In the second stage of the research the CG disclosure index for each selected company is calculated. The third stage lets to assess the factors influencing CG disclosure. During the fourth stage of the research the results of the research are evaluated and discussed.

Period of the research. The year 2014 is chosen because of information availability about CG disclosure practices since some of the annual reports of the year 2015 are still not available during the period of the research. The research on CG disclosure practices is conducted between February 1, 2016 and April 30, 2016.

Information sources. The secondary method for data collection has been employed in this research. Data is collected from firms' annual audited reports. According to M.Maingot and D.Zeghal (2008), M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2015), and OECD (2015) annual reports are considered to be the most useful and widely used data source and it is a major medium used by corporations to communicate information to outsiders. The information on independent variables is also collected from annual reports of the companies.

The research methods and logics of the research. Content analysis is a qualitative research method applied in many studies on CG disclosure. This method has been chosen for this research due to its appropriateness for this type of research. According to Y.Zhang, B.Wildemuth (2009) and H.Hsieh, S.Shannon (2005) content analysis is an empirical research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. Researchers regard content analysis as a flexible method for analyzing text data (Hsieh, Shannon, 2005). Summative content analysis approach has been applied. According to H.Hsieh and S.Shannon (2005) summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words of content.

Content analysis was applied using the annual reports of the research sample. Each annual report was carefully analyzed and scored for the development of the disclosure index based on a research-developed checklist. The content analysis and disclosure index were used by many researchers in their previous studies as appropriate and adequate methods for the evaluation of CG related information disclosure. In order to be able to determine the CG disclosure level weighted or un-weighted index can be applied. However, weighted disclosure index has been criticized since it may introduce a bias towards a particular user orientation and is based on a subjective importance of rating ranked by the researchers (Khaldoon, 2015a). Therefore, for the development of CG disclosure index the trichotomous un-weighted approach for scoring was employed. According to B.Biobele, I.Igbo, and E.John (2013) the un-weighted approach for scoring is preferred because each item of disclosure are equally important, it reduces subjectivity and provides a neutral assessment of items. It is a suitable research instrument in disclosure studies when the focus of the research is directed to all users of annual reports rather than any specific user group (Andersson, Daoud, 2005). Following

B.Biobele, I.Igbo, and E.John (2013) each item on the disclosure checklist is assigned a value between 0 and 2:

- 0 – if the item is not disclosed: there is no information provided in the annual report on this item;
- 1 – if the item is disclosed: the item is disclosed based on the criteria set out in the CG code;
- 2 – if the item is disclosed with details: the item is disclosed based on the criteria set out in the CG code and with additional explanations.

The total CG disclosure index is then calculated for each sample firm as a ratio of the total disclosure score to the maximum possible disclosure by the firm.

The coding sheet on disclosure of corporate governance by listed companies in Scandinavian and Baltic countries is provided in Appendix 5 with 62 items. The creation of coding sheet consists of two steps. First of all, CG codes of Scandinavian and Baltic countries were reviewed. The majority of items on CG disclosure set out in CG codes of these countries were included into the coding sheet. Second of all, as the literature on CG research was reviewed during theoretical analysis several elements of CG disclosure suggested by various researchers were included into the coding sheet. It helped to complete the coding sheet by adding a few more elements of CG disclosure. Finally, the coding sheet was used to evaluate CG disclosure of listed companies in Scandinavian and Baltic countries and to arrive at CG disclosure index for these companies. There are 62 elements in the coding sheet therefore the maximum score is 124. The total score is converted into an index to facilitate the comparison between companies as suggested by M.Maingot and D.Zeghal (2008).

Table 3. Measurement of dependent and independent variables

Variable			Measurement	Expected sign	Hypotheses
Dependent	Y	Corporate governance disclosure level	Corporate governance disclosure index (CGDI)		H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4, H_5, H_6
Independent	X_1	Company's size	Ln of total assets	+	H_2
	X_2	Company's profitability	Return on assets (ROA=net income/total assets)	+	H_3
	X_3	Board independence	Proportion of independent directors on the board (independent directors/all directors)	+	H_4
	X_4	Large audit firm	1 – Big-Four audit firm (Deloitte, KPMG, E&Y, PWC) 0 – other audit firm	+	H_5
	X_5	Audit committee	1 – audit committee is established 0 – audit committee is not established	+	H_6

Reference. Compiled by author.

After every company from the research sample is evaluated by the CG disclosure index, correlation analysis and multiple regression models are applied. Table 3 summarizes the information on dependent and independent variables and their measurement. As it was mentioned earlier and can be seen from the table dependent variable in the regression model is CG disclosure level measured by the CG disclosure index. Independent variables are: company's size, company's profitability, board independence, large audit firm, and audit committee.

Table 4. Criteria for accepting or rejecting hypotheses

Hypotheses		Accept/Reject	Criteria
H_1	Listed companies on the Scandinavian stock exchanges disclose significantly higher amount of CG related information.	**Accepting**	If the corporate governance disclosure index is 30% bigger in listed companies on Scandinavian stock exchanges compared with Baltic stock exchange.
		Rejecting	If the corporate governance disclosure index is 30% smaller in listed companies on Scandinavian stock exchanges compared with Baltic stock exchange.
H_2	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's size and the level of CG disclosure.	**Accepting**	$p \leq 0.05$
		Rejecting	$p > 0.05$
H_3	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's profitability and the level of CG disclosure.	**Accepting**	$p \leq 0.05$
		Rejecting	$p > 0.05$
H_4	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between independence of the board and the level of CG disclosure.	**Accepting**	$p \leq 0.05$
		Rejecting	$p > 0.05$
H_5	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between audit by large audit firms and the level of CG disclosure.	**Accepting**	$p \leq 0.05$
		Rejecting	$p > 0.05$
H_6	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between the existence of an audit committee and the level of CG disclosure.	**Accepting**	$p \leq 0.05$
		Rejecting	$p > 0.05$

Reference. Compiled by author.

The performed multiple regression model will provide justification in accepting or rejecting the formulated hypotheses which will let to evaluate which factors influence CG disclosure in listed companies on Baltic and Scandinavian stock exchanges. Criteria for accepting or rejecting hypotheses are provided in Table 4.

2.5. Limitations of the empirical research

For the research several limitations have been set and can be noticed in order to keep the research concentrated. The main limitations of the research can be considered the following:

1. Some difficulties measuring CG disclosure by listed companies in Baltic and Scandinavian countries can be experienced as the assessment of CG disclosure might be affected by the subjectivity of the researcher.
2. Although many control variables are used, other variables such as industry sector or growth rate could be included in the research. However, there is no proof about the effect of these variables on CG disclosure.
3. Since an un-weighted CG disclosure index was used, the results might be different if a weighted index would be used. A weighted index takes into the consideration the importance of the disclosed item.
4. The focus of this research is limited to only one source of information which is the annual report of the company. There are other sources of information such as company's website, interim reports or financial press releases, although annual reports are considered to be the most important source of information. However, other information sources might be used for future studies on CG disclosure.
5. As the period of the research is only one year, this can be regarded as the limitation of the research. However, in order to be able to cover more CG disclosure practices more companies were included in the research. Only one year period was chosen due to the fact that it was not the goal of this research to evaluate the changes in CG disclosure practices over the years. However, this might be done in future research on CG disclosure.
6. The research sample was limited to listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies. However, the factors influencing CG disclosure level could be assessed on broader level, for example including in the research not only Baltic but also Eastern Europe countries or member countries of the European Union.

Despite these limitations, the results of the research provide better understanding of the CG disclosure practices in listed companies on Baltic and Scandinavian stock exchanges. In the next chapter the results received from the conducted research on CG disclosure and its influencing factors among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies based on this methodology will be analyzed in detail.

III. RESEARCH RESULTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND ITS INFLUENCING FACTORS AMONG BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN LISTED COMPANIES AND DISCUSSION

In this part of diploma paper the results of the empirical research of CG disclosure and factors influencing it in Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies are presented. The factors and their influence on CG disclosure are assessed. The results of the empirical research are discussed based on the comparable analysis with the results of the previous researches. The recommendations for the improvements in Lithuanian CG code are provided.

3.1. The comparison of corporate governance codes

As it was mentioned in the methodology part in order to develop CG disclosure list CG codes of Baltic and Scandinavian countries were analyzed. Table 5 summarizes the main information on CG codes of Scandinavian and Baltic countries: the title of the code, the issuer of it, and the years of issued codes and their revisions.

Table 5. Countries and their corporate governance codes used in the research

Country	Corporate governance code	Issuer	Years of issued codes (first, revised, latest)
Lithuania	The Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on NASDAQ OMX Vilnius	NASDAQ OMX Vilnius	2006, 2009, 2010
Latvia	Principles of Corporate Governance and Recommendations on their Implementation	NASDAQ OMX Riga	2005, 2009, 2010
Estonia	Corporate Governance Recommendations	Financial Supervision Authority	2004, 2006
Finland	Finnish Corporate Governance Code	Securities Market Association	1997, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2015
Sweden	The Swedish Corporate Governance Code	Swedish Corporate Governance Board	2005, 2008, 2010, 2015
Norway	The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance	Norwegian Corporate Governance Board	2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014
Denmark	Recommendations on Corporate Governance	Committee on Corporate Governance	2001, 2005, 2008 (2 times), 2010, 2011, 2014
Iceland	The Guidelines on Corporate Governance	Iceland Chamber of Commerce, Confederation of Icelandic Employers, and NASDAQ OMX Iceland	2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2015

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with NCGB (2014), SCGB (2015), Iceland Chamber of Commerce (2015), Securities Market Association (2015), Committee on Corporate Governance (2014), NASDAQ OMX Riga (2010), Financial Supervision Authority (2006), and NASDAQ OMX Vilnius (2010).

As it can be seen from Table 5 the latest version of Lithuanian CG code was issued in 2010 by NASDAQ OMX Vilnius. However more up to date CG codes exist among

Scandinavian countries. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland recently updated their CG codes. These countries can be considered the countries that keep its CG codes up to date mostly due to recent and many revisions of their CG codes. This indicates that Scandinavian countries quickly react to changes in the market environment and by doing this improve their CG codes.

The requirements of CG disclosure by each researched countries' CG codes are provided in the Appendix 4. CG codes of Baltic and Scandinavian stock exchanges are quite similar. However some of them are more detailed and informative compared to each other. The analysis of CG codes revealed that CG codes of Scandinavian countries provide more detailed recommendations on good CG practices compared with CG codes of Baltic countries. The most exhaustive CG code can be considered to be the CG code of Norway's stock exchange. The structure of the CG codes differs from one stock exchange to another.

The areas in which Lithuania's CG code is the most different from the Scandinavian CG codes are corporate social responsibility, internal control system, and internal audit as the Lithuanian CG do not provide any recommendations in these areas however these areas are considered important in Scandinavia. It can be recommended to NASDAQ OMX Vilnius to include the recommendations on corporate social responsibility, internal control system, and internal audit process in the upcoming revisions of the Lithuanian CG code.

To summarize, it can be stated that despite the fact that structure of CG codes differ in Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the content of them is quite similar. However Lithuania's CG code do not provide any recommendations on corporate social responsibility, internal control system, and internal audit process, while there are recommendations on these topics in all Scandinavian CG codes. Scandinavian countries constantly revise their CG codes and keep them up to date which means that they quickly react to the changes in the market environment.

3.2. The assessment of the level of corporate governance disclosure

The research revealed that the level of CG disclosure among Baltic and Scandinavian countries differ to some extent. Appendix 6 provides all the information regarding CG disclosure level for all research sample companies. Scandinavian companies tend to disclose more CG related information compared with Baltic companies. Table 6 summarizes the main information regarding CG disclosure index. As it can be seen from the table the lowest value of CG disclosure index is equal to 20 (Latvia) and the maximum value of CG disclosure index is equal to 118 (Sweden). The table also shows that CG disclosure differs more in Baltic listed companies than Scandinavian listed companies as standard deviation is higher in Baltic listed companies compared with Scandinavian listed companies.

Table 6. Descriptive statistics of corporate governance disclosure level measurement scores (out of total score of 124)

	Min	Max	Mean	Mode	Median	Standard deviation
Lithuania	37	79	58	46	56	11,90
Latvia	20	54	29	22	27	7,79
Estonia	40	68	58	68	62	9,93
Finland	61	114	92	96	96	16,24
Sweden	73	118	100	101	101	9,15
Norway	78	111	101	105	103	6,88
Denmark	58	111	89	99	92	14,94
Iceland	43	117	71	-	69	24,34
Baltic	**20**	**79**	**47**	**22**	**49**	**17,38**
Scandinavian	**43**	**118**	**97**	**101**	**100**	**13,52**
Total	**20**	**118**	**87**	**101**	**97**	**24,51**

Reference. Compiled by author.

On average Scandinavian listed companies disclose two times more CG related information compared with Baltic listed companies. As it can be seen from Table 6 the average CG disclosure score for Lithuanian listed companies is 58, while in Scandinavian listed companies it is equal to 97, which means that Scandinavian listed companies disclose more CG related information by 67,24%. Therefore the hypothesis H_1 can be accepted: Listed companies on the Scandinavian stock exchanges disclose significantly higher amount of CG related information. Accepting this hypothesis proves the fact that Lithuanian listed companies do not fully comply with Lithuanian CG Code and do not provide all the necessary explanations while Scandinavian listed companies are highly up-to-date in CG disclosure and transparency.

As it was mentioned in the methodology part the total CG disclosure score is converted into CG disclosure index to easy the comparison between listed companies. CG disclosure index for each company is calculated as a ratio of the total disclosure score by each company to the maximum possible disclosure score. Figure 7 shows CG disclosure index divided into intervals and the number of companies that belong to each interval. CG disclosure index can have a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 1 therefore CG disclosure index was divided into 5 equal intervals. CG disclosure index in the interval [0,0-0,2) can be regarded as very low, [0,2-0,4) – low, [0,4-0,6) – medium, [0,6-0,8) – high, and [0,8-1,0] – very high. As it can be seen from Figure 7 the majority of analyzed companies (45,15%) have a very high CG disclosure index. Just 2,61% of analyzed companies have a very low CG disclosure index.



Figure 7. Corporate governance disclosure index

Reference. Compiled by author.

Table 7 provides information on CG disclosure index by countries which allows identifying the differences between Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. Very low CG disclosure index is attributable to 7 Latvian listed companies which consist 2,61% of the whole research sample. The majority of Lithuanian listed companies have the CG disclosure index of the medium level. While in Latvia the majority of listed companies fall into the area of low CG disclosure index, in Estonia – medium. None of the Baltic listed companies have a very high CG disclosure index and just 2 companies in Lithuania are considered to have a high CG disclosure index.

Table 7. Corporate governance disclosure index by countries

	Very low [0,0-0,2)		Low [0,2-0,4)		Medium [0,4-0,6)		High [0,6-0,8)		Very high [0,8-1,0]	
	# of comp.	%	# of comp.	%	# of comp.	%	# of comp.	%	# of comp.	%
Lithuania	0	0,00%	5	1,87%	15	5,60%	2	0,75%	0	0,00%
Latvia	7	2,61%	12	4,48%	1	0,37%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
Estonia	0	0,00%	3	1,12%	9	3,36%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
Finland	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	7	2,61%	13	4,85%	12	4,48%
Sweden	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	1	0,37%	30	11,19%	69	25,75%
Norway	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	13	4,85%	27	10,07%
Denmark	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	7	2,61%	16	5,97%	12	4,48%
Iceland	0	0,00%	2	0,75%	3	1,12%	1	0,37%	1	0,37%
Baltic	**7**	**2,61%**	**20**	**7,46%**	**25**	**9,33%**	**2**	**0,75%**	**0**	**0,00%**
Scandinavian	**0**	**0,00%**	**2**	**0,75%**	**18**	**6,71%**	**73**	**27,24%**	**121**	**45,15%**
Total	**7**	**2,61%**	**22**	**8,21%**	**43**	**16,04%**	**75**	**27,99%**	**121**	**45,15%**

Reference. Compiled by author.

Situation among Scandinavian listed companies is different. None of the Scandinavian listed companies have a very low CG disclosure index and just 2 companies in

Iceland have a low CG disclosure index. Most of the Scandinavian listed companies belong to the interval of a very high CG disclosure index. This reveals big differences between Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. Scandinavian listed companies disclose more CG related information and that disclosure is of a very high level.

Further the main topics of CG disclosure will be analyzed in more detail. As it can be seen from CG disclosure list used in this diploma paper (Appendix 5) there are eight main topics on the CG disclosure list. The main topics include the business strategy and policies (I), board of directors (II), board committees (III), risk management and internal control (IV), external auditor (V), CEO (VI), management team and other executives (VII), and remuneration (VIII). Figure 8 shows the average score that each topic got during the evaluation procedure.



Figure 8. Average score of corporate governance disclosure measurement topics

Reference. Compiled by author.

As it can be seen from the Figure 8 on average the most disclosed topics are CEO, management team and other executives, and risk management and internal control. Among Scandinavian listed companies the most disclosed topics are the same as total average however among Baltic countries the most disclosed topics are different. The business strategy and policies, remuneration, and the board of directors are the most disclosed topics among Baltic listed companies however these topics are disclosed with much less detail than in Scandinavian listed companies. In Baltic countries the least disclosed area is board committees as the majority of companies do not have specific board committees therefore their disclosure in this area is limited. Scandinavian companies also disclose the smallest amount of information on board committees compared with other topics.

I. The business strategy and policies

Table 8 provides details on the CG disclosure of each item (items 1-13) under the topic business strategy and policies (I). As it can be seen from the table Norway's listed companies provide the most detailed information about their business strategy and policies. Among Baltic listed companies, companies listed on Estonia's stock exchange provide the most exhaustive information. Latvian listed companies lack CG disclosure on their business strategy and policies. The average score for Lithuanian listed companies is equal to 1,29 which is lower than in Scandinavian companies.

While analyzing the disclosed items it is clearly seen that among Baltic listed companies the basic corporate values and ethical guidelines (item 3) and the existence of enterprise code of ethics (item 6) are the least disclosed items. Among the Scandinavian listed companies the least disclosed items include procedures in place to protect the interests of minority shareholders (item 13) and the existence of an enterprise code of ethics (item 6). Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies the most information disclose on the financial and operating results of the company (item 9), the nature of company's business activities (item 1), and information on compliance with corporate governance code (item 5).

Table 8. Average CG disclosure on the business strategy and policies (I)

	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)													
	I													
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**Av.**
Lithuania	1,73	1,59	0,36	1,45	2,00	0,00	1,09	0,91	2,00	1,00	1,73	1,91	1,00	1,29
Latvia	1,40	0,65	0,00	1,05	1,10	0,00	0,25	0,35	2,00	0,95	1,25	1,05	0,10	0,78
Estonia	2,00	1,58	0,50	2,00	2,00	0,17	1,58	1,25	2,00	1,50	1,67	2,00	0,50	1,44
Finland	1,94	1,81	0,56	2,00	2,00	0,53	1,53	1,66	2,00	1,22	1,72	2,00	0,00	1,46
Sweden	1,98	1,95	0,69	2,00	2,00	0,66	1,76	1,90	1,99	1,13	1,75	2,00	0,07	1,53
Norway	2,00	2,00	1,93	2,00	2,00	1,90	2,00	2,00	2,00	1,65	2,00	2,00	0,60	1,85
Denmark	1,97	1,97	0,80	1,97	1,97	0,43	1,91	2,00	2,00	1,20	1,94	2,00	0,20	1,57
Iceland	1,71	1,57	1,29	2,00	2,00	0,86	1,29	1,57	1,86	1,29	1,57	1,71	0,00	1,44
Baltic	**1,67**	**1,24**	**0,26**	**1,43**	**1,67**	**0,04**	**0,89**	**0,78**	**2,00**	**1,09**	**1,54**	**1,61**	**0,56**	**1,14**
Scandinavian	**1,97**	**1,93**	**0,94**	**2,00**	**2,00**	**0,84**	**1,78**	**1,89**	**1,99**	**1,26**	**1,82**	**1,99**	**0,18**	**1,58**
Total	**1,91**	**1,79**	**0,80**	**1,88**	**1,93**	**0,68**	**1,60**	**1,66**	**1,99**	**1,22**	**1,76**	**1,91**	**0,25**	**1,49**

Reference. Compiled by author.

II. Board of directors

Table 9 provides details on the CG disclosure of each item (items 14-25) under the topic board of directors (II). The same tendency is applicable here: Norwegian listed companies disclose the highest amount of information while Latvian listed companies disclose the lowest amount of information. The most disclosed items among Baltic as well as Scandinavian listed companies are composition of board of directors (item 14) and the structure, role, and duties of the board (item 15).

Table 9. Average CG disclosure on the board of directors (II)

	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)												
	II												
	14	**15**	**16**	**17**	**18**	**19**	**20**	**21**	**22**	**23**	**24**	**25**	**Av.**
Lithuania	1,73	1,68	1,14	0,32	1,09	1,68	1,50	1,05	1,00	0,59	1,18	1,18	1,18
Latvia	1,10	1,05	0,20	0,00	0,65	0,30	0,45	1,10	0,80	0,00	1,05	1,10	0,65
Estonia	1,83	1,58	0,92	0,50	0,83	1,92	1,58	1,00	1,25	0,00	1,92	2,00	1,28
Finland	2,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	1,50	1,88	1,97	1,91	0,44	0,97	2,00	0,06	1,56
Sweden	2,00	2,00	1,94	1,98	1,21	2,00	2,00	1,97	0,51	1,44	1,91	0,04	1,58
Norway	2,00	2,00	1,98	1,95	1,35	1,98	2,00	1,98	1,05	1,13	2,00	0,00	1,62
Denmark	1,97	1,91	1,43	1,80	1,43	1,97	1,94	1,97	0,29	1,37	1,57	0,09	1,48
Iceland	1,86	1,71	1,57	1,00	1,29	1,71	1,71	1,71	0,29	0,57	1,29	0,00	1,23
Baltic	**1,52**	**1,43**	**0,74**	**0,24**	**0,87**	**1,22**	**1,13**	**1,06**	**0,98**	**0,24**	**1,30**	**1,33**	**1,00**
Scandinavian	**1,99**	**1,98**	**1,86**	**1,92**	**1,32**	**1,96**	**1,98**	**1,95**	**0,56**	**1,27**	**1,86**	**0,04**	**1,56**
Total	**1,90**	**1,87**	**1,63**	**1,58**	**1,23**	**1,81**	**1,81**	**1,77**	**0,64**	**1,06**	**1,75**	**0,30**	**1,45**

Reference. Compiled by author.

The disclosure on supervisory board (item 25) is very low among Scandinavian companies due to the fact that just a few Scandinavian companies have a supervisory board. Baltic listed companies lack disclosure on executive and non-executive directors (item 17) and performance evaluation process of the board (item 23). Disclosure on potential conflicts of interest (item 22) is lower among Scandinavian listed companies.

III. Board committees



Figure 9. Average score on corporate governance disclosure on board committees

Reference. Compiled by author.

Figure 9 shows average score for each country on nomination, audit, remuneration, and other committees. As it is seen from the figure CG disclosure on board committees differs a lot between countries. On average the most disclosed committee is audit committee, then nomination committee and remuneration committee. Sweden and Norway disclose the most information on board committees, while Latvia and Estonia disclose less information.

Lithuania is among the countries with low disclosure level on board committees.

The disclosure on other committees is limited due to the fact that not all the companies have established other companies. 11,57% of the analyzed listed companies have established other committees. Some of these established committees are related with CG and disclosure as for example “Corporate governance committee” in *Tallinna Vesi* (Estonia) or “Disclosure committee” in *Swedish Match* (Sweden). There are also committees related with corporate social responsibility: “Global responsibility and ethics committee” in *Stora Enso Oyj* (Finland), “Health, safety, and environment committee” in *Archer Limited* (Norway). Other established committees are related with finance, research and development.

Table 10. Average CG disclosure on the nomination, audit, remuneration, and other committees (III)

	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)										
	III										
	26	**27**	**28**	**29**	**30**	**31**	**Av.**	**32**	**33**	**34**	**35**
Lithuania	0,91	0,73	0,09	0,09	0,09	0,09	0,33	1,14	1,45	0,59	0,86
Latvia	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,05	0,01	0,95	0,70	0,05	0,15
Estonia	0,08	0,17	0,08	0,08	0,08	0,00	0,08	1,25	1,42	0,83	0,75
Finland	1,38	1,34	1,25	1,03	1,28	1,34	1,27	1,53	1,34	1,25	1,06
Sweden	1,97	1,88	1,87	1,14	1,93	1,33	1,69	1,89	1,72	1,74	1,04
Norway	1,98	1,75	1,90	1,00	1,90	1,00	1,59	1,93	1,60	1,80	0,95
Denmark	1,26	0,91	0,89	0,54	0,94	0,71	0,88	1,60	1,46	1,46	1,00
Iceland	1,14	0,86	0,29	0,29	0,29	0,29	0,52	1,29	1,29	0,86	0,57
Baltic	**0,39**	**0,33**	**0,06**	**0,06**	**0,06**	**0,06**	**0,16**	**1,09**	**1,17**	**0,44**	**0,57**
Scandinavian	**1,74**	**1,58**	**1,57**	**0,97**	**1,61**	**1,14**	**1,44**	**1,78**	**1,58**	**1,60**	**1,00**
Total	**1,47**	**1,33**	**1,26**	**0,79**	**1,30**	**0,92**	**1,18**	**1,64**	**1,50**	**1,37**	**0,92**
	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)										
	III										
	36	**37**	**Av.**	**38**	**39**	**40**	**41**	**42**	**43**	**Av.**	**44**
Lithuania	1,09	0,36	0,92	0,86	0,77	0,14	0,14	0,18	0,14	0,37	0,14
Latvia	0,15	0,05	0,34	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Estonia	0,83	0,50	0,93	0,08	0,17	0,08	0,08	0,08	0,00	0,08	0,17
Finland	1,28	1,34	1,30	1,34	1,31	1,22	1,06	1,25	1,31	1,25	0,38
Sweden	1,78	1,26	1,57	1,90	1,76	1,79	1,05	1,83	1,27	1,60	0,28
Norway	1,80	0,95	1,50	1,73	1,23	1,40	0,75	1,40	0,75	1,21	0,20
Denmark	1,57	1,23	1,39	1,26	0,89	0,89	0,54	0,94	0,69	0,87	0,31
Iceland	1,43	1,43	1,14	1,00	1,00	0,71	0,43	1,29	1,14	0,93	0,29
Baltic	**0,69**	**0,28**	**0,71**	**0,37**	**0,35**	**0,07**	**0,07**	**0,09**	**0,06**	**0,17**	**0,09**
Scandinavian	**1,66**	**1,21**	**1,47**	**1,65**	**1,43**	**1,45**	**0,89**	**1,50**	**1,08**	**1,33**	**0,29**
Total	**1,47**	**1,03**	**1,32**	**1,39**	**1,21**	**1,17**	**0,73**	**1,22**	**0,87**	**1,10**	**0,25**

Reference. Compiled by author.

Table 10 provides details on the CG disclosure of each item (items 26-44) under the topic board committees (III). As it can be seen from the table the smallest amount of information is disclosed on each committees’ the term of office for which members are appointed to (items 29, 35, 41) and the number of committee meetings held and the attendance (items 31, 37, 43). Scandinavian listed companies provide more information on board committees in all items of the CG disclosure list in comparison with Baltic listed companies.

IV. Risk management and internal control. V. External auditor

Table 11 provides details on the CG disclosure of each item (items 45-49) under the topic risk management and internal control (IV) and items (50-54) under the topic external auditor (V). The table shows that Scandinavian companies are much more willing to disclose information regarding risk management (item 47), internal control system (item 48), and internal audit (item 49) compared with Baltic companies. It is obvious from the table that none of the analyzed Lithuanian listed companies disclose information on the internal audit function in the company although it is not required by Lithuanian Corporate Governance Code.

The disclosure on independence of external auditor (item 50) and the audit statement (item 54) is very similar both among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. Huge differences can be noticed on disclosure on audit partner rotation (item 51), remuneration to the auditor (item 52), and other services provided by the auditor (item 53). Scandinavian listed companies disclose more information on these topics compared with Baltic listed companies. None of the Lithuanian listed companies disclose information regarding audit partner rotation and the duration of the current auditor (item 51).

Table 11. Average CG disclosure on the risk management, internal control (IV) and external auditor (V)

	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)											
	IV						**V**					
	45	**46**	**47**	**48**	**49**	**Av.**	**50**	**51**	**52**	**53**	**54**	**Av.**
Lithuania	1,59	2,00	0,91	0,36	0,00	0,97	1,00	0,00	0,32	0,68	2,00	0,80
Latvia	0,75	1,30	1,05	0,35	0,20	0,73	1,00	0,10	0,15	0,05	2,00	0,66
Estonia	2,00	2,00	1,08	0,00	0,17	1,05	1,00	0,58	0,75	0,42	2,00	0,95
Finland	1,78	2,00	2,00	1,84	1,31	1,79	1,00	1,16	1,91	1,88	2,00	1,59
Sweden	1,99	2,00	2,00	1,80	1,37	1,83	1,03	1,11	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,62
Norway	2,00	2,00	2,00	1,40	1,18	1,72	1,05	1,05	2,00	2,00	2,00	1,62
Denmark	1,97	1,97	1,97	1,66	1,14	1,74	1,00	1,00	1,94	1,94	2,00	1,58
Iceland	1,43	2,00	1,57	1,00	0,57	1,31	1,00	0,43	0,29	0,29	1,71	0,74
Baltic	**1,37**	**1,74**	**1,00**	**0,28**	**0,11**	**0,90**	**1,00**	**0,17**	**0,35**	**0,39**	**2,00**	**0,78**
Scandinavian	**1,94**	**2,00**	**1,98**	**1,68**	**1,26**	**1,77**	**1,02**	**1,07**	**1,91**	**1,91**	**1,98**	**1,58**
Total	**1,82**	**1,94**	**1,78**	**1,40**	**1,03**	**1,60**	**1,02**	**0,88**	**1,60**	**1,60**	**1,99**	**1,42**

Reference. Compiled by author.

VI. CEO. VII. Management team and other executives. VIII. Remuneration

Table 12 provides details on the CG disclosure of each item (items 55-57) under the topic CEO (VI), items (58-60) under the topic management team and other executives (VII), and items (61-62) under the topic remuneration (VIII). Scandinavian listed companies disclose more information on these topics compared with Baltic listed companies. The average disclosure on the items under these topics is quite similar among Baltic listed companies. Latvian listed companies do not disclose any information on CEO and other executives.

Table 12. Average CG disclosure on the CEO (VI), management team and other executives (VII), and remuneration (VIII)

	Item on corporate governance disclosure list (Appendix 4)										
	VI				VII				VIII		
	55	**56**	**57**	**Av.**	**58**	**59**	**60**	**Av.**	**61**	**62**	**Av.**
Lithuania	1,32	0,86	1,00	1,06	1,05	1,09	1,00	1,05	1,00	1,00	1,00
Latvia	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,70	0,90	0,80
Estonia	1,00	0,75	0,75	0,83	0,75	0,50	0,33	0,53	1,58	1,25	1,42
Finland	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,72	1,72	1,72	1,72	1,91	2,00	1,95
Sweden	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,98	1,45	1,53	1,49
Norway	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,88	1,83	1,83	1,83
Denmark	1,97	1,97	1,97	1,97	1,94	1,94	1,94	1,94	1,80	1,89	1,84
Iceland	1,71	1,57	1,71	1,67	1,57	1,57	1,57	1,57	0,71	0,71	0,71
Baltic	**0,76**	**0,52**	**0,57**	**0,62**	**0,59**	**0,56**	**0,48**	**0,54**	**1,02**	**1,02**	**1,02**
Scandinavian	**1,92**	**1,91**	**1,92**	**1,91**	**1,90**	**1,90**	**1,90**	**1,90**	**1,62**	**1,69**	**1,65**
Total	**1,68**	**1,63**	**1,65**	**1,65**	**1,64**	**1,63**	**1,62**	**1,63**	**1,50**	**1,55**	**1,53**

Reference. Compiled by author.

As it can be seen from Table 12 the least disclosed item under the topic CEO (VI) is CEO’s significant professional commitments outside the company (item 56) however the differences are not big as compared with other items. Data on other executives (item 60) is the least disclosed item under the topic management team and other executives (VII). Remuneration policy and principles (item 61) is the least disclosed item under the topic remuneration (VIII). On average Lithuanian listed companies received score of 1 for this item however most of companies do not really explain their remuneration policy however they say that such policy exists and it is confidential.

To summarize, as the analysis of CG disclosure index shows Scandinavian listed companies disclose more CG related information compared with Baltic listed companies. Among the Scandinavian listed companies Norwegian companies are the ones that have higher CG disclosure level. CG disclosure level in Lithuanian listed companies is higher than Baltic average however it is still much smaller than Scandinavian companies’ especially in such areas as remuneration, executive directors, and CEO.

3.3. Analysis of factors influencing the level of corporate governance disclosure

In the previous subchapter the CG disclosure index was analyzed. As it was mentioned in the methodology part CG disclosure index is the dependent variable. In this subchapter the independent variables will be analyzed in more detail and the results of the performed regression model will be presented. There are 5 independent variables that are believed to explain and influence the level of CG disclosure index. These variables include: size of the company, company's profitability, independence of the board, audit firm, and audit committee. Appendix 7 provides collected information on the independent variables. The values of the independent variables are quite dispersed. 9,33% of analyzed companies have the auditor who does not belong to the Big4 group, while the rest 90,67% have the auditor from the Big4 group. There are 12,69% companies in the research sample that do not have an audit committee and the other 87,31% have established audit committees in their companies.

As the size of the company was measured by total assets, the values of total assets differ a lot. The minimum value of total assets is equal to 1,56 million euros, while the maximum value is 2059,2 billion euros. The size of the companies' assets is equal to 14,2 billion euros on average. The same tendency can be noticed in companies' profitability ratios: the lowest profitability ratio is -64,08%, while the highest is 51,87%, however the average return on assets is 3,51%. The independence of board of directors is dispersed as well with some companies having none independence and others having full independence. Table 13 provides information on the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors. As it can be seen from the table Scandinavian companies have more independent board of directors and just in a few Baltic listed companies independence of board of directors can be considered high.

Table 13. Proportion of independent directors on the board of directors

	Very low [0,0-0,2)		**Low [0,2-0,4)**		**Medium [0,4-0,6)**		**High [0,6-0,8)**		**Very high [0,8-1,0]**	
	# of comp.	**%**	**# of comp.**	**%**	**# of comp.**	**%**	**# of comp.**	**%**	**# of comp.**	**%**
Lithuania	15	5,60%	7	2,61%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
Latvia	14	5,22%	3	1,12%	2	0,75%	1	0,37%	0	0,00%
Estonia	4	1,49%	5	1,87%	3	1,12%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
Finland	0	0,00%	1	0,37%	2	0,75%	6	2,24%	23	8,58%
Sweden	1	0,37%	11	4,10%	38	14,18%	27	10,07%	23	8,58%
Norway	0	0,00%	10	3,73%	11	4,10%	14	5,22%	5	1,87%
Denmark	0	0,00%	10	3,73%	13	4,85%	6	2,24%	6	2,24%
Iceland	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	1	0,37%	1	0,37%	5	1,87%
Baltic	**33**	**12,31%**	**15**	**5,60%**	**5**	**1,87%**	**1**	**0,37%**	**0**	**0,00%**
Scandinavian	**1**	**0,37%**	**32**	**11,94%**	**65**	**24,25%**	**54**	**20,15%**	**62**	**23,13%**
Total	**34**	**12,69%**	**47**	**17,54%**	**70**	**26,12%**	**55**	**20,52%**	**62**	**23,13%**

Reference. Compiled by author.

Correlation analysis is run between the variables in order to determine whether the linear relationship between dependent and independent variables exist. The results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 14. All the independent variables have the positive influence on the dependent variable which means that when the value of independent variables is increasing, the value of the dependent variable is also increasing. This influence is significant as it can be seen from Appendix 8. However the strength of the influence is different. Company's size, independence of the board, and audit firm has an average strength of influence on the CG disclosure index. The influence of audit committee is weak, while the influence of company's profitability can be considered as very weak.

Table 14. Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent and independent variables

	Company's size (X_1)	Company's profitability (X_2)	Independence of the board (X_3)	Audit firm (X_4)	Audit committee (X_5)
Corporate governance disclosure index (Y)	0,592	0,225	0,542	0,510	0,302

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with data from SPSS statistical program (Appendix 8).

Despite the fact that correlation analysis shows that the significant relationship between dependent and independent variables exist it is not sufficient evidence to accept or reject hypotheses therefore multiple regression analysis is performed. According to Table 15 composed model explains 56,8% of the dependent variable. Which means that the analyzed independent variables (company's size, profitability, independence of the board, audit firm and audit committee) influence the dependent variable (CG disclosure index) by 56,8% and 43,2% of dependent variable can be explained by other factors. As it was analyzed in the theoretical part these other factors could be company age, liquidity, board size, CEO duality or ownership structure.

Table 15. Composed multiple regression model summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,759[a]	,576	,568	,12961
a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit_committee, Independence, Profitability, Size_ln, Audit_firm				

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with data from SPSS statistical program.

Table 16. Composed multiple regression model's statistical significance

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	5,983	5	1,197	71,232	,000[b]
	Residual	4,401	262	,017		
	Total	10,384	267			
a. Dependent Variable: CGDI						
b. Predictors: (Constant), Audit_committee, Independence, Profitability, Size_ln, Audit_firm						

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with data from SPSS statistical program.

Table 16 shows the statistical significance of the composed model. As it can be seen from the table the value of Sig. is equal to 0,00 which is lower than 0,05 and it means that the composed model is statistically significant and can be used for further analysis and explanations.

Table 17 summarizes the information regarding the statistical significance of the independent variables. As Table 17 shows the Sig. value for independent variable profitability is equal to 0,23 which is higher than 0,05. This means that profitability is not statistically significant independent variable. Therefore it can be stated that company's profitability does not have a statistically significant influence on the CG disclosure index and hypothesis H_3 (there is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's profitability and the level of corporate governance disclosure) have to be rejected despite the fact that the influence is positive.

Sig. value for size, independence, audit firm, and audit committee is equal to 0,00 which is lower than 0,05. Therefore these variables are statistically significant. As the sign before the coefficient (under the column "unstandardized B") is positive for these independent variables, it means that these variables have a statistically significant positive influence on CG disclosure index. Therefore hypotheses can be accepted. Hypothesis H_2 (there is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's size and the level of corporate governance disclosure) can be accepted. This means that bigger Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies disclose more CG related information and it can be explained by the fact that bigger companies receive more attention from the public and regulators which give them more incentive to disclose more information.

Table 17. Composed multiple regression model's statistical significance of the coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,043	,047		-,927	,355
	Size_ln	,032	,004	,378	8,178	,000
	Profitability	,001	,001	,050	1,202	,230
	Independence	,250	,030	,368	8,328	,000
	Audit_firm	,128	,032	,189	4,035	,000
	Audit_committee	,090	,025	,152	3,619	,000
a. Dependent Variable: CGDI						

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with data from SPSS statistical program.

Hypothesis H_4 (there is a positive statistically significant relationship between independence of the board and the level of corporate governance disclosure) can be accepted as well based on the results of the multiple regression model (Table 17). As independent directors are from outside of the company they have less incentive to withhold CG related information inside the company. Bigger proportion of independent directors on the board leads to higher CG disclosure levels among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. Companies with smaller proportion of the independent directors disclose less CG related information.

Hypothesis H_5 (there is a positive statistically significant relationship between audit by large audit firms and the level of CG disclosure) is accepted. This means that Scandinavian and Baltic listed companies that have the auditor who belongs to one of the Big-Four audit companies (Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst&Young or PricewaterhouseCoopers) disclose more CG related information. On the other hand companies that have other auditors tend to disclose less CG related information. Therefore it can be stated that Big-Four audit firm encourage Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies to disclose more CG related information and in such way to reduce information asymmetry between company's managers and shareholders.

Hypothesis H_6 (there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the existence of an audit committee and the level of corporate governance disclosure) is accepted based on the research results. Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies that have established the audit committee, disclose more information, while companies without audit committee disclose the limited amount of CG related information. Existence of the audit committee in the company improves internal control system and in such way improves the levels and quality of CG disclosure.

To summarize, it can be stated that company's size, board independence, audit committee, and Big-Four audit firms have a positive statistically significant influence on CG disclosure level among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. These variables explain 56,8% of CG disclosure level while the rest 43,2% can be explained by other factors. Company's profitability does not have a statistically significant influence on CG disclosure level however it is positive.

3.4. The assessment of the research results and discussion

Table 18 summarizes the research results in the form of accepted and rejected research hypotheses. As it was explained in the previous subchapter and can be seen from Table 18 all hypotheses are accepted except for hypothesis H_3. Company's size, board independence, large audit firms, and audit committee have a positive statistically significant influence on CG disclosure level however profitability do not statistically significantly influence the level of CG disclosure. Further all the variables will be analyzed in light and comparison with other researches.

Table 18. Accepted and rejected research hypotheses

Hypotheses		Result	Accepted/ Rejected
H_1	Listed companies on the Scandinavian stock exchanges disclose significantly higher amount of CG related information.	Scandinavian listed companies on average disclose 67,24% more CG related information.	**Accepted**
H_2	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's size and the level of CG disclosure.	$p \leq 0{,}05$	**Accepted**
H_3	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between company's profitability and the level of CG disclosure.	$p > 0{,}05$	**Rejected**
H_4	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between independence of the board and the level of CG disclosure.	$p \leq 0{,}05$	**Accepted**
H_5	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between audit by large audit firms and the level of CG disclosure.	$p \leq 0{,}05$	**Accepted**
H_6	There is a positive statistically significant relationship between the existence of an audit committee and the level of CG disclosure.	$p \leq 0{,}05$	**Accepted**

Reference. Compiled by author.

Company's size. In this research it was found out that company's size has a positive statistically significant influence on the level of CG disclosure. The results do not contradict the theory that bigger companies disclose more CG related information compared with small companies. The main reason behind this is that larger corporations receive more attention from the public and governmental organizations which give them incentive to disclose more information as it might enhance their image and reputation. The same results were found by A.G.Khaldoon (2015b) and M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005). These authors found positive statistically significant association between company's size and the level of CG disclosure. However C.B.Ali (2014) and E.Al-Moataz, K.Hussainey (2013) found positive but statistically insignificant relationship between these variables.

Company's profitability. In this research company's profitability was found out to be a statistically insignificant variable which contradicts the theory. Based on theory managers of highly profitable companies are more likely to report more information to increase investors' confidence and to raise capital at the lowest cost. A.G.Khaldoon (2015b) and E.Al-Moataz, K.Hussainey (2013) also found positive statistically significant relationship between company's profitability and the level of CG disclosure. The differences between the results can be explained by the fact that the research sample and period are different. Moreover, in this research companies' profitability varied a lot between high extremes which might be the reason why company's profitability was found to be statistically insignificant.

Board independence. Board independence has a positive statistically significant influence on the level of CG disclosure in this research. The results go along with the theory that bigger proportion of independent directors on the board of directors increases CG disclosure due to the fact that independent directors strengthen the extent to which a board of directors is independent of the management and increases the effectiveness and monitoring of the board. C.B.Ali (2008) also found positive statistically significant relationship between board independence and the level of CG disclosure. However the majority of other analyzed authors (Andersson, Daoud (2005), Khaldoon (2015a, 2015b), Al-Moataz, Hussainey (2013), Ramli, Surbaini, Ramli (2013), Ali (2014)) have found negative and statistically insignificant relationship.

Audit firm. It was found that Big-Four audit firms have a positive statistically significant influence on the level of CG disclosure among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies. A.G.Khaldoon (2015b) and J.A.Ramli, K.N.Surbaini, and M.I.Ramli (2013) in their researches also found positive statistically significant relationship between these variables. These results do not contradict the theory that Big-Four audit firms encourage and require more detailed CG disclosures. On the contrary, M.Andersson and M.Daoud (2005) found negative insignificant association between large audit firm and the level of CG disclosure. However these authors (Andersson, Daoud, 2005) still believe that large audit firms may encourage the clients to disclose more CG information, to reduce information asymmetry between the managers and the shareholders and to protect the audit firm's reputation.

Audit committee. Audit committee has a positive statistically significant influence of the level of CG disclosure among listed Baltic and Scandinavian companies. The theory also states that the existence of audit committee in the company is associated with higher CG disclosure levels. Other researchers (Andersson, Daoud (2005), Khaldoon (2015a, 2015b), Al-Moataz, Hussainey (2013)) also found positive statistically significant association between the existence of audit committee and the level of CG disclosure. The existence of an audit committee may improve internal control system and is regarded as an effective monitoring device for reducing managerial opportunism and improving disclosure quality.

The factors that determine the level of CG disclosure among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies are determined and explain differences in CG disclosure level between analyzed countries. In general Lithuanian listed companies are smaller than Scandinavian ones, the level of board independence is lower, and there are more companies that do not have established the audit committee and that do not have an auditor which is one of the Big-Four. These factors explain why CG disclosure levels are lower in Lithuanian listed companies compared with Scandinavian listed companies. However as the practice shows there are some ways how CG disclosure levels can be improved.

During the data collection process a lot of annual reports of companies and their CG statements have been analyzed. CG information is provided in a number of different formats and styles among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies which makes comparisons across various countries very difficult, although, the comparisons across companies within the same country are not much easier as well. All Lithuanian listed companies provide CG information in a standard report of a form of a table where each company states whether it complies with the corporate governance recommendations and provides explanations. However those explanations are very rare and limited to the answer yes or no. The opinion of the author of this diploma paper is that such way of disclosing CG information limits the possibility for the companies to disclose more information and can be the reason why the levels of CG disclosure among Lithuanian listed companies are lower compared with Scandinavian ones.

The research by ECODA (2015) reveals some insights how other European countries dealt with the problem of low compliance with the CG codes and non-disclosure. For example, in France CG code developers established "High Committee" which gives companies opinion on their compliance with the CG code and companies are obliged to mention this opinion in their annual report. If the companies do not comply with the CG code, the High Committee can start a public name and shame approach according to ECODA (2015).

Another way to increase the level of CG disclosure might be sanctions however official sanctions have not been implemented so far regarding the "comply or explain" approach and even without sanctions most countries have witnessed a significant improvement in the quality of CG reporting according to ECODA (2015). Although, sanctions can be imposed when the company provides incorrect or misleading information, or when information is missing. Such sanctions put the liability of the company's director at stake and the reputation of the company might suffer.

On the contrary to the sanctions there are awards for good CG practices and disclosure. According to ECODA (2015) awards for the "Best Corporate Governance Report" might stimulate a gradual improvement in CG reporting. For example, in Croatia there are awards for the best relationship with investors, in Estonia – awards for good investor relations and governance based on 160 evaluation criteria, in Sweden – awards for the best CG reporting, in Slovakia – awards for the best governance reporting practices.

The Baltic States also promotes good CG practices by the "Baltic Market Awards". There eight categories under which companies compete to be renowned as the best based on 160 criteria. These categories include the best investor relations, the most visible improvement over the year, the best interactive investor relations, the best investor relations according to the market professionals, the best annual and CG report, member of the year, the most trustworthy company according to investors, and top performers over 10 years. According to A.Ranonytė (2016) during the past 10 years the quality of annual and CG reports at NASDAQ OMX Baltic has increased by 57%, the quality of online investor relations has improved by 66%, and the overall average quality of investor relations has increased by 33%. These results indicate that promoting best CG practices has been effective.

Other countries promote good CG practices and disclosure by personalized letters and dialogue with the company. Constructive dialogues are developing with companies, taking the form of guidance letters and/or feedback (ECODA, 2015). For example, in Spain letters are sent to the Secretary of the Board, while in Belgium the chairman of the board is contacted. It is also beneficial to identify where recommendations seem to be problematic to comply with and to provide additional guidance. For example Belgian Corporate Governance Commission developed additional guidance notes. Some countries also try to promote good CG practices by sharing information and organizing seminars and conferences regarding the promotion of good CG practices.

As the analysis shows and as it was mentioned earlier Lithuanian listed companies lack more detailed information and explanations regarding CG. The analysis of CG disclosure practices of Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies and their CG codes' recommendations show that there are areas where Lithuanian CG could be revised and improved. These include corporate social responsibility, internal control system, and internal audit.

Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (NCGB, 2014) states that "the board of directors should define the company's basic corporate values and formulate ethical guidelines and guidelines for corporate social responsibility in accordance with these values". It is believed that these values and guidelines play an important role in the way how they company is perceived in the society. The concept of corporate social responsibility includes a wide variety of areas such as human rights, environmental issues, health and safety, prevention of corruption, and employee rights. Not only Norway has such recommendation on company's values and corporate social responsibility, other Scandinavian countries have set such recommendation as well. Iceland Chamber of Commerce (2012) states that the company that sets and discloses values, ethical norms, and CSR policy, will not only promote a healthier economy and improved relations with stakeholders, but also reinforce its operating basis with an increased appearance of reliability and credibility, an improved sense of risk, happier employees, and improved competitiveness.

There are already some Lithuanian listed companies that disclose their corporate values and guidelines for corporate social responsibility voluntarily, but in the most cases such disclosure is absent. Disclosure on corporate social responsibility would provide more information on the company, its activities and policies and in such a way might enhance awareness of corporate social responsibility and encourage socially responsible investing and according to NCGB (2014) corporate values represent an important foundation for corporate governance.

Another area for the improvement of Lithuanian corporate governance code is internal control system. The majority of Scandinavian countries recommend for listed companies to disclose information regarding internal control system except for Sweden. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (NCBG, 2014) clearly recommends that the board should provide "sufficient and properly structured information to make it possible for shareholders to understand how the company's internal control system is organized which includes the control environment, risk evaluation, control activities, information and communication and follow-up".

Closely related to the area of internal control system is internal audit function in the company. Following Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market Association, 2010) "the company shall disclose the manner in which the internal audit function of the company is organized and define the operating principles of internal control". Some Lithuanian listed companies already disclose small amount of information on internal control system voluntarily however none of them disclose any information regarding internal audit function in the company.

The recommendations on the disclosure on remuneration policy are very broad both in Baltic and Scandinavian countries however the disclosed information is very limited among Lithuanian listed companies. Majority of Lithuanian listed companies state that such remuneration policy exists however it cannot be disclosed as it is very sensitive and confidential information and might create competitive disadvantage for the company without any further explanations. The same tendency is with the remuneration paid to the board members. In the best case scenario the total sum of the remuneration is disclosed. However Scandinavian listed companies provide very detailed information on remuneration policy and remuneration paid to each board member. This can be explained by the cultural differences among the countries as Scandinavian countries are very transparent in the area of CG on the contrary to Baltic countries.

To summarize, it can be stated that the results of this research do not contradict the theory only the company's profitability was found to be statistically insignificant however still positive. In general Lithuanian listed companies are smaller than Scandinavian ones, the level of board independence is lower, and there are more companies that do not have established the audit committee and that do not have an auditor which is one of the Big-Four. These factors explain why CG disclosure levels are lower in Lithuanian listed companies compared with Scandinavian listed companies.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Theoretical analysis of CG disclosure and the empirical research on CG disclosure and factors influencing it among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies provides the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Theoretical analysis revealed that CG can be understood as a way a company is managed and controlled in a transparent, accountable, fair, and responsible manner taking into account interest of various stakeholders. Good CG practices not only reduce the risk of fraud and corporate failure, but it also increases trust in the market and the company itself, and makes access to the capital easier. Greater transparency in disclosure is necessary for effective financial reporting and supervision as well as effectively functioning capital market. Transparency in disclosure helps to deter and prevent frauds, avoid financial scandals, corruption and to enhance allocation of resources. Sound CG disclosure practices also differentiate companies from the ones with poor CG disclosure. Strong CG disclosure can increase external financing, investment, growth, and employment creation.
2. Agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and institutional theories together cover different types of stakeholders within the companies and can be considered to create an effective CG framework. Agency theory focus on the relationship between the management and the principal, while stakeholder theory includes social relationships with other stakeholder groups and institutional theory introduces rules, regulation, and their enforcement.
3. The CG framework for listed companies in the European Union is a combination of hard law (legislation) and CG codes (soft law). European Commission's focus on CG and its release of directives and recommendations regarding CG practices provides listed companies guidelines how to structure their CG models and regulators how the national CG codes could be improved and adjusted according to the legislation. CG codes encourage best practice in CG and change behavior. The good CG presented in CG codes strengthens confidence and trust in companies, and help to ensure the greatest possible value creation over time in the best interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders.
4. There are many factors that influence CG disclosure. The company with long history, bigger in size, more profitable, and liquid, is expected to disclose more CG related information. The existence of audit committee and Big-Four audit firms may also

enhance CG disclosure. Bigger number of independent directors on the board of directors should encourage better CG reporting. However CEO duality is associated with poor CG disclosure as the opportunistic behavior may encourage CEO/chairman to withhold unfavorable information within the company.

5. In order to be able to assess the factors influencing the level of CG disclosure among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies content analysis and multiple regression analysis were the main research methods used. Content analysis was used to assess the level of CG disclosure while multiple regression analysis was used to check whether factors such as company's size, company's profitability, board independence, audit committee, and large audit firms have an influence on such level of CG disclosure.
6. Despite the fact that structure of CG codes differ in Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the content of them is quite similar. The analysis of CG disclosure practices of Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies and their CG codes' recommendations show that there are areas where Lithuanian CG could be revised and improved. The main difference between Lithuanian and Scandinavian CG codes is that Lithuania's CG code does not provide any recommendations on corporate social responsibility, internal control system, and internal audit process, while there are recommendations on these topics in all Scandinavian CG codes. Scandinavian countries constantly revise their CG codes and keep them up to date which means that they quickly react to the changes in the market environment and encourage the companies to adapt to these changes.
7. The assessed level of CG disclosure by CG disclosure index shows that Scandinavian listed companies on average disclose 67,24% more CG related information compared with Baltic listed companies. Among the Scandinavian listed companies Norwegian companies are the ones that have higher CG disclosure levels. As the analysis showed Lithuanian listed companies lack more detailed information and explanations regarding CG. CG disclosure level in Lithuanian listed companies is 23,4% higher than Baltic average however it is still much smaller (-40,21%) than Scandinavian companies' especially in such areas as remuneration, executive directors, and CEO.
8. The empirical research revealed that company's size, board independence, audit committee, and Big-Four audit firms have a positive statistically significant influence on CG disclosure level among Baltic and Scandinavian listed companies. These variables explain 56,8% of CG disclosure level while the rest 43,2% can be explained by other factors. Company's profitability does not have a statistically significant

influence on CG disclosure level however it is positive.

9. The results of this research do not contradict the theory only the company's profitability was found to be statistically insignificant however still positive. In general Lithuanian listed companies are smaller than Scandinavian ones, the level of board independence is lower, and there are more companies that do not have established the audit committee and that do not have an auditor which is one of the Big-Four. These factors might be used to explain why CG disclosure levels are lower in Lithuanian listed companies compared with Scandinavian listed companies.
10. As the empirical research results show in order to be able to increase the level of CG disclosure the initiative in the listed companies should come from the independent board members, audit committee, and large audit firms. However while disclosing CG related information listed companies must have in mind that higher levels of CG disclosure are also related with higher costs and that not all information can be disclosed publicly due to confidentiality reasons. Therefore the company with its independent board members, audit committee, and the audit firm should find the optimal point of CG disclosure that would benefit the company and would not harm it.
11. This research is not only beneficial for the companies itself that were included in the research sample as these companies can assess the level of their CG disclosure and where they stand in comparison with other companies and even competitors. The research is also beneficial for the regulators and the stock exchanges as they can see where there are low levels of CG disclosure, where companies might need guidance with certain CG recommendations, and in which areas CG codes could be improved. Investors can also benefit from this research as they can see what kind of information the companies provide, and can assume that the company with higher level of CG disclosure can be considered more sound and transparent. The results of the research also provide better understanding of the CG disclosure practices in listed companies on Baltic and Scandinavian stock exchanges.
12. For further development of the empirical research on CG disclosure and factors influencing it can be suggested to include more years and to evaluate changes in CG disclosure practices over the years; not to limit information disclosed only to annual reports and to analyze other sources of information such as company's website, interim reports or financial press releases; to include more companies from different regions, e.g. Eastern Europe or European Union; to try to find what is the optimal level of CG disclosure which benefits but do not harm the company.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1. MAIN CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

Annual General Meeting – a company gathering, usually held at the end of each financial year, at which shareholders and management discuss the previous year and the outlook for the future, directors are elected and other shareholder concerns are addressed (BICG, 2010a).

Board of directors – the collective group of individuals elected by the shareholders of a company to oversee the management of the corporation on their behalf (BICG, 2010a).

Chairman of the board – the highest-ranking director in a corporation's board of directors (BICG, 2010a).

Chief executive officer (CEO/managing director) – is a corporate body that is in charge of the day-to-day management of the company in accordance with the instructions and orders issued by the board (Securities Market Association, 2010).

"Comply or explain" approach – approach meaning that a company choosing to depart from a corporate governance code has to explain which parts of the corporate governance code it has departed from and the reasons for doing so (European Commission, 2013).

Conflict of interest – when someone is in a position of trust which requires them to exercise judgment on behalf of others and also has interests of the sort that might interfere with the exercise of their judgment, and which the person is ethically required to either eschew or openly attest (BICG, 2010a).

Corporate governance – the rules and incentives by which the management of a company is directed and controlled so as to maximize the profitability and long-term value of the firm for its shareholders while taking into account the interests of other legitimate stakeholders (BICG, 2010a).

Corporate governance code – a systematically arranged set of principles, standards, best practices and/or recommendations that is precatory in nature, is neither legally nor contractually binding, related to the internal governance of corporations (covering topics such as the treatment of shareholders, the organization and practices of boards and corporate transparency), and is issued by a collective body (Nanka-Bruce, 2009).

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) – the company's responsibility for the manner in which its activities affect people, society and the environment, and it typically addresses human rights, prevention of corruption, employee rights, health and safety and the working environment, and discrimination, as well as environmental issues (NCGB, 2014).

Disclosure – a whole array of different forms of information produced by companies, such as annual reports which include the director's statement, the operating and financial overview, the profit and loss account, balance sheet, cash flow statement and other items (Solomon, 2010).

Executive director – a member of a company's board of directors who is also an employee of the company (BICG, 2010a).

Independent director – a director who is not connected with the listed company or its promoters or directors on the basis of family relationship and who does not have any other relationship whether pecuniary or otherwise with the company, its associated companies, directors, executives or related parties (BICG, 2010a).

Information asymmetry – imperfect information as to each other's' actions, knowledge, and preferences (Fard, Fard, Darvish, 2015).

Internal control – the whole system of controls, financial and otherwise, established in order to provide reasonable assurance of: effective and efficient operations; internal financial control; and compliance with laws and regulations (Solomon, 2010).

Material information – information, whose omission or misstatement, could influence the economic decision taken by users of information (Fung, 2014).

Moral hazard – a change in behavior resulting from changes to risk exposure (FRC, 2011).

Non-executive director – a person with no employment relationship or service contract with the company (Securities Market Association, 2010).

Related parties – entities that control or are under common control with the company, significant shareholders including members or their families and key management personnel (OECD, 2015).

Shareholder – a person or entity that owns shares of stock in a company (BICG, 2010a).

Short-termism – a tendency to foreshorten the time horizon applied to investment decisions, or raise the discount rate above that appropriate to the firm's opportunity cost of capital (Solomon, 2010).

Stakeholder – any group, individual or institution that has an interest in a company (BICG, 2010a). Stakeholders is the concept that includes investors, employees, creditors, suppliers, clients, local community and other persons having certain interest in the company concerned (NASDAQ OMX Vilnius, 2010).

APPENDIX 2. DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Author	Definition
OECD (2015)	Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.
Fard, Fard, Darvish (2015)	Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a corporation's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides a principled process and structure through which the objectives of the corporation, the means of attaining the objectives, and systems of monitoring performance are set.
Ali (2008)	Corporate governance – all the organizational mechanisms which have the effect of bounding the powers and of influencing the decisions of the managers, in other words, which delimit their driving and define their discretionary space.
Lekvall (2014)	Corporate governance – a framework through which a company is governed in order to ensure that the company is run in the best interest of its owners. A corporate governance model is how this framework is set up for a certain type of company, e.g. a listed company, or a geographical region.
Darškuvienė, Vazniokas (2007)	Corporate governance – area of economic science and practical activities which, according to external and internal factors of a corporation, aim at the most efficient allocation of rights and obligations between subjects consisting of corporate governance elements in order for the corporation to reach the maximum value for the shareholders with the minimum of resources.
FRC (2011)	Corporate governance – a means to establish a system of control between the board and management as well as accountability from the board to the shareholders. This system of control accountability facilitates long-term sustainable economic growth by aligning incentives between those who manage and those who own companies.
Karagiorgos et al. (2010)	Corporate governance – the total of operations and controls of an organization or as an overall structured system of principles according to which an enterprise operates and is organized, managed, and controlled.
Brandas (2013)	Corporate governance – a system of regulations, processes and actions by which companies are directed and controlled in order to reduce agency problems in the relationship between shareholders (principal) and managers (agent).
Solomon (2010)	Corporate governance – a system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity.
Kousalya, Revathi, Mohan (2013)	Corporate governance – a system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of monitoring the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risk stemming from devious deeds of these corporate officers.
NASDAQ OMX Vilnius (2010)	Corporate governance – a framework of the company's management and control. Corporate governance covers relationships between bodies of corporate management and supervision, the company's shareholders and stakeholders.
Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas (2013)	Corporate governance – the interaction among internal, external stakeholders and members of the board which is oriented towards the creation of value within a company.
Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2012)	Corporate governance – relations between company's governing and monitoring bodies, company's shareholders, and other stakeholders which influence company's activities and ability to attract capital needed for economic growth.
Horak, Dumančic (2013)	Corporate governance – the relationship between shareholders, creditors and corporations; between financial markets, institutions and corporations; and between employees and corporations; a set of mechanism through which firms operate when ownership is separated form management.

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with OECD (2015), Fard, Frad, Darvish (2015), Ali (2008), Lekvall (2014), Darškuvienė, Vazniokas (2007), FRC (2011), Karagiorgos et al. (2010), Brandas (2013), Solomon (2010), Kousalya, Revathi, Mohan (2013), NASDAQ OMX Vilnius (2010), Aleliūnaitė, Christauskas (2013), Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2012), Horak, Dumančic (2013).

APPENDIX 3. LISTED COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE OF THE RESEARCH

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
		LITHUANIA	
1	Agrowill Group	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/avg/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
2	Amber Grid	Oil & Gas	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/amg/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
3	Apranga	Consumer services	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/apg/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
4	City Service	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/cts/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
5	Dvarčionių keramika	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/dkr/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
6	Grigeo Grigiškės	Basic materials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/grg/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
7	Gubernija	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/gub/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
8	Kauno energija	Utilities	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/knr/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
9	Klaipėdos nafta	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/knf/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
10	Lietuvos energijos gamyba	Utilities	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/lnr/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
11	Linas	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/lns/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
12	Litgrid	Utilities	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/lgd/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
13	Panevėžio statybos trestas	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/ptr/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
14	Pieno žvaigždės	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/pzv/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
15	Rokiškio sūris	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/rsu/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
16	Snaigė	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/sng/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
17	TEO LT	Telecommunications	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/teo/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
18	Utenos trikotažas	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/utr/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
19	Vilkyškių pieninė	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/vlp/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
20	Vilniaus baldai	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/vbl/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
21	Vilniaus degtinė	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/vdg/2014_ar_en_ltl_solo_ias.pdf
22	Žemaitijos pienas	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/zmp/2014_ar_en_ltl_con_ias.pdf
		LATVIA	
23	Brīvais Vilnis	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/brv/2014_cg_en.pdf
24	Daugavpils Lokomotīvju remonta rūpnīca	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/lok/2014_cg_en.pdf
25	Ditton pievadķēžu rūpnīca	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/dpk/2014_cg_en.pdf
26	Grindeks	Health care	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/grd/2014_cg_en.pdf
27	Grobiņa	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/grz/2014_cg_en.pdf
28	Kurzemes atslēga 1	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/ka1/2014_cg_en.pdf
29	Kurzemes CMAS	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/kcm/2014_cg_en.pdf
30	Latvijas balzams	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/bal/2014_cg_en.pdf
31	Latvijas Gāze	Utilities	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/gze/2014_cg_en.pdf
32	Latvijas Jūras medicīnas centrs	Health care	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/ljm/2014_cg_en.pdf
33	Latvijas kuģniecība	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/lsc/2014_cg_en.pdf
34	Latvijas tilti	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/ltt/2014_cg_en.pdf
35	Olainfarm	Health care	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/olf/2014_cg_en.pdf

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
36	PATA Saldus	Basic materials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/sma/2014_cg_en.pdf
37	Rīgas autoelektroaparātu rūpnīca	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/rar/2014_cg_en.pdf
38	Rīgas elektromašīnbūves rūpnīca	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/rer/2014_cg_en.pdf
39	Rīgas juvelierizstrādājumu rūpnīca	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/rjr/2014_cg_en.pdf
40	Rīgas kuģu būvētava	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/rkb/2014_cg_en.pdf
41	SAF Tehnika	Technology	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/saf/2014_cg_en.pdf
42	Siguldas CMAS	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/scm/2014_cg_en.pdf
ESTONIA			
43	Baltika	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/blt/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
44	Ekspress Grupp	Consumer services	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/eeg/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
45	Harju Elekter	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/hae/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
46	Merko Ehitus	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/mrk/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
47	Nordecon	Industrials	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/ncn/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
48	Olympic Entertainment Group	Consumer services	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/oeg/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
49	PRFoods	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/prf/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
50	Silvano Fashion Group	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/sfg/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
51	Skano Group	Consumer goods	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/skn/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
52	Tallink Grupp	Consumer services	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/tal/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
53	Tallinna Kaubamaja Grupp	Consumer services	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/tkm/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
54	Tallinna Vesi	Utilities	http://www.nasdaqbaltic.com/upload/reports/tve/2014_ar_en_eur_con_00.pdf
FINLAND			
55	Amer Sports Oyj	Consumer goods	http://www.amersports.com/docs/default-source/INVESTOR-RELATIONS/Annual-reviews/amer-sports-financial-review-2014DB70250447C6.pdf?sfvrsn=2
56	Fiskars Oyj Abp	Consumer goods	http://www.fiskarsgroup.com/sites/default/files/Fiskars-Annual-Report-2014-_-ENG_11032015.pdf
57	Kesko Oyj	Consumer services	http://www.kesko.fi/globalassets/03-sijoittaja/raporttikeskus/2015/2500-kesko_keskos_year_2014.pdf
58	Metso Oyj	Industrials	http://www.metso.com/reports/2014/assets/pdf/metso_financial_statements_2014_english.pdf
59	Neste Corporation	Oil & Gas	https://www.neste.com/sites/default/files/674547.pdf
60	Orion	Health care	http://www.orion.fi/globalassets/documents/orion-group/corporate-governance/cg-reports/orion.-corporate-governance-statement-04-02-2015.pdf
61	Stora Enso Oyj	Basic materials	http://assets.storaenso.com/se/com/DownloadCenterDocuments/Corporate_Governance_Report_2014.pdf
62	Tieto Oyj	Technology	https://www.tieto.com/sites/default/files/files/tieto_annual_report_2014.pdf
63	Valmet Oyj	Industrials	http://www.valmet.com/globalassets/investors/reports--presentations/annual-reports/valmet-corporate-governance-statement-2014.pdf
64	Ahlstrom Oyj	Basic materials	http://www.ahlstrom.com/globalassets/files/publications/annual-report-2014-financials.pdf
65	Alma Media Oyj	Consumer services	http://d2asyz8lpscdp0.cloudfront.net/docs/default-source/investors/corporate-governance-statement/en/corporate-governance-statement-2014-%28published-24-february-2015%29.pdf?sfvrsn=2
66	Basware Oyj	Technology	http://annualreport2014.basware.com/css/pdf/Basware-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
67	Finnair Oyj	Consumer services	http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/hallinnointi/Finnair2014_EN_CG_statement_final.pdf

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
68	Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj	Industrials	http://www.lassila-tikanoja.fi/en/company/annual-report-2014/pdf/lt-financial-statements-and-corporate-governance-2014.pdf
69	Outotec Oyj	Industrials	http://www.outotec.com/Global/Investors/Corporate%20governance/Outotec_CG_2014_ENGLISH_060215_FINAL.pdf
70	Revenio Group Oyj	Health care	http://www.reveniogroup.fi/files/vuosikertomukset/revenio_group_vuosikertomus_2014_eng.pdf
71	Stockmann Oyj Abp	Consumer services	http://www.stockmanngroup.com/documents/10157/16273/Stockmann+Corporate+Governance+Statement+2014.pdf/2c5fcbfe-5c4b-4f1a-a3cd-3f0c6cfe1ae4
72	Viking Line Abp	Consumer services	http://www.vikingline.com/Documents/investors/annual%20reports/%C3%85rsber%C3%A4ttelsen%202014%20-%20eng.pdf
73	Afarak Group	Basic materials	http://www.afarak.com/site_media/media/cms_page_media/97/Afarak%20Group%20AR%202014_1.pdf
74	Affecto Oyj	Technology	http://affecto.com/app/uploads/Affecto_2014_Financial_Statements.pdf?4f5d79
75	Biohit Oyj	Health care	https://www.sartorius.com/fileadmin/media/global/company/ir/ir_annual_report_2014_sartorius_group-en.pdf
76	Digia Oyj	Technology	http://vuosikertomus2014.digia.com/filebank/132-Digia-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
77	Comptel Oyj	Technology	http://www.comptel.com/docs/default-source/annual-reports/comptel-annual-report-2014.pdf?sfvrsn=2
78	Innofactor Plc	Technology	http://www.innofactor.com/instancedata/if/embeds/innofactorwwwstructure/76996_vuosikertomus2014-WEB-ENG.pdf
79	Okmetic Oyj	Technology	http://www.okmetic.com/sites/default/files/attachments/groups/okmetic_annual_report_2014.pdf
80	QPR Software Oyj	Technology	http://www.qpr.com/sites/default/files/QPRSoftwareAnnualReport2014.pdf
81	Raute Oyj	Industrials	http://www.raute.com/documents/10157/860082/Financial+statements+2014.pdf/afbd43f0-cc8d-44f5-abcb-3d5a6e78f7c9
82	Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhtiö Oyj	Basic materials	http://www.talvivaara.com/files/talvivaara/30.4.2015/Talvivaara%20Financial%20Statements%202014%2030.4.2015.pdf
83	Talentum Oyj	Consumer services	http://www.talentum.com/multimedia/archive/00116/Talentum_Annual_Rep_116623a.pdf
84	Fortum Oyj	Utilities	http://apps.fortum.fi/gallery/Fortum_Annual_Report_2014_low.pdf
85	Kemira Oyj	Basic materials	http://www.kemira.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/newsroom/publications/annual-reports/2014/kemira-financial-statements-in-annual-report-2014.pdf
86	Nokia Oyj	Technology	http://company.nokia.com/sites/default/files/download/investors/nokia_uk_ar14_full.pdf
SWEDEN			
87	Com Hem Holding	Telecommunications	http://www.comhemgroup.se/en/investors/financial-reports-presentations/?rep_year=2015&rep_type=annual
88	Lundin Petroleum	Oil & Gas	https://www.lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/ar_2014_e.pdf
89	Millicom Int. Cellular SDB	Telecommunications	http://www.millicom.com/media/2512085/MillicomAR2014.pdf
90	Tele2	Telecommunications	http://www.tele2.com/Documents/reports/2014/TL2020_AR14_ENG_150324_2.pdf
91	Telia Company	Telecommunications	http://www.teliacompany.com/globalassets/teliasonera-corporate/documents/reports/2014/annual-report/teliasonera_annual-and-sustainability-report_2014_eng.pdf
92	EnQuest PLC	Oil & Gas	http://www.enquest.com/~/media/Files/E/Enquest/Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202014/21831-enquest-ar14-interactive-new.pdf
93	Tethys Oil	Oil & Gas	http://www.tethysoil.com/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Tethys_AR2014_eng.pdf

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
94	Arise	Utilities	http://www.arise.se/afw/files/press/arise/201504070052-1.pdf
95	Etrion	Utilities	https://www.etrion.com/dm/Documents/ar_2014.pdf
96	AAK	Consumer goods	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2C/8C/5C/wkr0006.pdf
97	Alfa Laval	Industrials	http://www.alfalaval.com/globalassets/documents/investors/english/annual-reports/alfa_laval_www_en_14_low.pdf
98	Autoliv SDB	Consumer goods	https://www.autoliv.com/Investors/Financial%20Reports/AR2014.pdf
99	Axfood	Consumer services	http://investor.axfood.se/files/press/axfood/AXF_AR14_eng_webb.pdf
100	Axis	Technology	http://www.axis.com/corporate/investor/files/annual_report_2014_en.pdf
101	Betsson	Consumer services	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-1D21B7/1927207522x0x820484/11CFB695-EF0D-44D4-8E90-3506C92C2BC3/2014_Annual_Report.pdf
102	BillerudKorsnäs	Basic materials	http://www.billerudkorsnas.com/PageFiles/18105/sista/%C3%85R%20eng%20web.pdf?epslanguage=en
103	Boliden	Basic materials	http://ir.boliden.com/afw/files/press/boliden/Boliden_ar14_2015-03-10_ENG.pdf
104	Dometic Group	Consumer goods	http://www.dometicgroup.com/Global/4_Investors/AnnualReports/Annual-Report-2014.pdf
105	Elekta	Health care	https://www.elekta.com/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meetings/2015/Elekta-AR-2014_15_English.pdf
106	Electrolux	Consumer goods	http://www.electroluxgroup.com/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/02/Electrolux-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
107	Ericsson	Technology	http://www.ericsson.com/res/investors/docs/2014/ericsson-annual-report-2014-en.pdf
108	Hennes & Mauritz	Consumer services	https://about.hm.com/content/dam/hm/about/documents/en/Annual%20Report/Annual%20Report%202014_en.pdf
109	Holmen	Basic materials	https://vp165.alertir.com/afw/files/press/holmen/201503201694-1.pdf
110	HEXPOL	Basic materials	http://investors.hexpol.com/afw/files/press/hexpol/201504080903-1.pdf
111	ICA Gruppen	Consumer services	http://www.icagruppen.se/globalassets/3.-investerare/5.-rapporter/arkiv---finansiellt/engelska/2015/02.-annual-report-2014/ica-gruppen-annual-report-2014.pdf
112	Indutrade	Industrials	http://mb.cision.com/Main/2210/9751543/363809.pdf
113	Lifco	Industrials	http://mb.cision.com/Main/5431/9756815/367314.pdf
114	Loomis	Industrials	http://www.loomis.com/PageFiles/7769/Eng_final_web.pdf
115	Meda	Health care	http://www.meda.se/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokument/PDF/Meda_AR14_ENG_Indexerad.pdf
116	Modern Times Group	Consumer services	https://www.mtg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MTG_eng_2014.pdf
117	NetEnt	Consumer services	https://www.netent.com/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Netent-AR14-ENG-150401.pdf
118	Nobia	Consumer goods	https://www.nobia.com/Documents/Reports/2015/Nobia_Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
119	SAAB	Industrials	http://saabgroup.com/globalassets/cision/documents/2015/20150313-saabs-annual-report-for-2014-now-available-en-2-988879.pdf
120	Sandvik	Industrials	http://www.home.sandvik/globalassets/sandvik_ar_2014_engprintedversion.pdf
121	SCA	Consumer goods	http://www.sca.com/Documents/en/Annual_Reports/sca-annual-report-2014.pdf?epslanguage=en
122	Securitas	Industrials	http://www.securitas.com/globalassets/com/files/annual-reports/en/securitas_ab_annual_report_2014.pdf
123	Swedish Orphan Biovitrum	Health care	http://www.sobi.com/Global/Financial%20information/Annual%20Reports/Sobi%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
124	SSAB	Basic materials	http://www.ssab.com/Company/Investors/Reports-and-presentations

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
125	SWECO	Industrials	http://portalvhds1fxb0jchzgjph.blob.core.windows.net/press-releases-attachments./508790/359770.pdf
126	Swedish Match	Consumer goods	http://www.swedishmatch.com/Reports/Annual%20reports/2014_Swedish%20MatchAnnualReport_EN.pdf
127	Volvo	Industrials	http://www3.volvo.com/investors/finrep/ar14/ar_2014_eng.pdf
128	Arcam	Industrials	http://www.arcamgroup.com/files/Arcam-Annual-Report-2014-ENG-final.pdf
129	Bilia	Consumer services	http://www.bilia.com/EPiUpload/COM/Rapporter/Bilia_annual_report_2014.pdf
130	Bulten	Consumer goods	http://mb.cision.com/Main/405/9756490/367094.pdf
131	Capio	Health care	http://capio.com/siteassets/capio.com/financial-information/capio_annual_report_eng_2014.pdf
132	Cloetta	Consumer goods	http://www.cloetta.com/en/files/Cloetta-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
133	Clas Ohlson	Consumer services	http://about.clasohlson.com/globalassets/annualreports/clas-ohlson-annual-report-2014-15.pdf
134	CLX Communications	Technology	https://clxcommunications.com/site/uploads/%C3%85rsredovisning-CLX-Communications-AB-English.pdf
135	Concentric	Industrials	http://www.concentricab.com/_downloads/AGM-2015/Concentric_AR_2014_ENG.pdf?dt=z9zfxfmn
136	Duni	Consumer goods	http://duni.inpubl.com/2014/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/04/Duni_14_EN_single.pdf
137	Dustin Group	Consumer services	http://www.dustingroup.com/afw/files/press/dustin/201511275323-1.pdf
138	Eltel	Industrials	http://www.eltelgroup.com/en/eltel-annual-report-2014/
139	Fagerhult	Industrials	http://www.fagerhultgroup.com/afw/files/press/fagerhult/201503168779-1.pdf
140	Gränges	Consumer goods	http://www.granges.com/globalassets/05.-investerare/03.-rapporter-och-presentationer/2015/02.-arsredovisning-for-2014/granges-annual-report-2014.pdf
141	Gunnebo	Industrials	http://www.gunnebogroup.com/en/GunneboDocuments/Gunnebo-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
142	Haldex	Consumer goods	http://corporate.haldex.com/media/1804/wkr0006.pdf
143	HMS Networks	Technology	http://www.hms-networks.com/docs/librariesprovider6/annual-reports/annual-reports-%28english%29/hms-2014-ar-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=6
144	Industrial & Financial Systems	Technology	http://www.ifsworld.com/en/sitecore/media-library/assets/2015/03/04/15/46/2014-annual-report/
145	Invisio Communications	Technology	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-3VJITV/1934415000x0x821840/BB683683-AA48-4088-89CD-F0B9DEFA14BF/INVISIO_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
146	KappAhl	Consumer services	http://www.kappahl.com/globalassets/about-kappahl-corporate/documents/ir-documents/annual--interim-reports/20142015/kappahl_annual_report_2015_part2.pdf
147	Lagercrantz Group	Industrials	http://www.lagercrantz.com/Documents/Finansiella%20rapporter/2014-15/LcG_AR1415_Eng_150701.pdf
148	Mekonomen	Consumer goods	http://vp083.alertir.com/files/press/mekonomen/201503232734-2.pdf
149	Munksjö Oyj	Basic materials	http://investors.munksjo.com/~/media/Files/M/Munksjo-IR/reports-and-presentations-new-en/2014/munksjo-eng.PDF
150	Medivir	Health care	http://www.medivir.se/v5/images/pdf/2015/ENG-Medivir_web2014.pdf
151	Oasmia Pharmaceutical	Health care	http://www.oasmia.com/html/upl/605/Oasmia%20Pharmaceutical%20Annual%20Report%202015.pdf
152	Oriflame Holding	Consumer goods	http://investors.oriflame.com/files/press/oriflame/Oriflame_Cosmetics_Annual_Report_2014_print.pdf
153	Orexo	Health care	http://www.orexo.com/ar/2014/orexo2014en.pdf
154	Qliro Group	Consumer services	http://www.qlirogroup.com/Global/Qliro%20Group%20Annual%20Report%202014/Qliro%20Group%20AB%20-%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
155	Rezidor Hotel Group	Consumer services	http://www.rezidor.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=205430&p=irol-library
156	SAS	Consumer services	http://www.sasgroup.net/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/SAS-Annual-Report-2014-2015.pdf

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
157	Scandi Standard	Consumer goods	http://investors.scandistandard.com/afw/files/press/scandistandard/201504133817-1.pdf
158	SkiStar	Consumer services	https://vp042.alertir.com/afw/files/press/skistar/AR_1415_Eng_mindre.pdf
159	Systemair	Industrials	https://www.systemair.com/globalassets/websites/corporate/investors/annual-reports/systemair-ar-2014-15-gb.pdf
160	Thule Group	Consumer goods	http://www.thulegroup.com/afw/files/press/thule/201504070334-1.pdf
161	Tobii	Technology	http://www.tobii.com/siteassets/tobii-group/investor-relations/tobii_annual_report_2014_en.pdf
162	Transcom WorldWide	Industrials	http://www.transcom.com/Documents/Pressmeddelanden/1869594.pdf
163	Acando	Technology	https://www.acandogroup.com/Global/SWE/IR/AGM%202015%20ENG/Acando%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
164	Allenex	Health care	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2C/B8/D8/wkr0006.pdf
165	Anoto Group	Technology	http://www.anoto.com/media/1877/anoto-ar14-eng-150521-korr10.pdf
166	BE Group	Basic materials	http://investors.begroup.com/files/press/begroup/201503264955-1.pdf
167	Beijer Electronics	Industrials	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2D/19/A2/wkr0006.pdf
168	BioInvent International	Health care	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2C/2D/02/wkr0006.pdf
169	Bong	Industrials	http://www.bong.com/en/investors/reports/annual-reports
170	Björn Borg	Consumer goods	http://corporate.bjornborg.com/files/press/bjornborg/BB_AR_2014_UK.pdf
171	BTS Group	Industrials	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-DL7WI/1939759811x0x822661/49B0B9CB-E964-48EF-ABEB-56516A53544E/BTS_Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf
172	Consilium	Industrials	http://www.consilium.se/sites/default/files/consilium_annual_report_2014.pdf
173	G5 Entertainment	Technology	http://www.g5e.com/documents/2014/G5_Entertainment_Annual_Report_2014_Eng.pdf
174	Hansa Medical	Health care	http://mb.cision.com/Main/1219/9765539/373626.pdf
175	I.A.R Systems Group	Technology	http://mb.cision.com/Main/1072/9746204/359999.pdf
176	Karo Pharma	Health care	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2C/6B/A3/wkr0006.pdf
177	Karolinska Development	Health care	http://www.karolinskadevelopment.com/files/8714/3021/4509/Karolinska%20Development%20AB%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
178	Moberg Pharma	Health care	http://www.mobergpharma.com/sites/default/files/moberg_pharma_2014_eng_final_v3_web.pdf
179	MQ Holding	Consumer services	http://ir.mq.se/sites/default/files/report/mq_ar_eng_2014_15_final.pdf
180	Net Insight	Technology	http://investors.netinsight.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/06/Net-Insight-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
181	Nordic Mines	Basic materials	http://www.nordicmines.com/sites/default/files/Nordic%20Mines%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
182	NOTE	Industrials	http://www.note.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Annual-Report-2014-uppslag.pdf
183	NeuroVive Pharmaceutical	Health care	http://www.neurovive.se/images/reports/NeuroVive_EN_2014_03_17.pdf
184	Odd Molly International	Consumer goods	https://mb.cision.com/Main/495/9756053/366752.pdf
185	Trention	Consumer goods	http://mb.cision.com/Main/494/9799306/397366.pdf
186	Proact IT Group	Technology	http://feed.ne.cision.com/wpyfs/00/00/00/00/00/2D/8C/0D/wkr0006.pdf
NORWAY			
187	AF Gruppen ASA	Industrials	http://www.afgruppen.com/upload/Finans/Annual%20Report%202014%20%28spread%29.pdf
188	African Petroleum Corporation Limited	Oil & Gas	http://www.africanpetroleum.com.au/investors/reports-and-presentations
189	Akastor ASA	Oil & Gas	https://www.akastor.com/globalassets/documents/annual-general-meeting/akastor-annual-report-2014_print-friendly.pdf

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
190	Aker Philadelphia Shipyard ASA	Industrials	http://files.zetta.no/www-phillyshipyard-com/upload/akps_final.pdf
191	Aker Solutions ASA	Oil & Gas	http://akersolutions.com/globalassets/huginreport/2014/annual-report-2014.pdf
192	AKVA Group ASA	Industrials	http://ir.akvagroup.com/investor%20relations/financial%20info/annual%20reports/2014%20annual%20report%20eng.pdf
193	Apptix ASA	Technology	http://investors.apptix.com/SitePages/Financial-Results.aspx
194	Aqualis ASA	Oil & Gas	http://aqualis.no.gridhosted.co.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/aqualis-asa-annual-report-2014.pdf
195	Archer Limited	Oil & Gas	http://archerwell.com/content/uploads/2015/04/annual-report-2014_1.pdf
196	Atea ASA	Technology	http://www.atea.com/Documents/.com/Reports/Atea_Annual_report_2014.pdf
197	Aurora LPG Holding ASA	Industrials	http://www.auroralpg.com/media/2014/02/Aurora-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
198	Austevoll Seafood ASA	Consumer goods	http://www.auss.no/Files/Filer/Auss/pdf/Annual%20report/Annual%20Report%202014%20Austevoll%20Seafood%20ASA.pdf
199	Bakkafrost P/F	Consumer goods	http://www.bakkafrost.com/media/1234/annual-report-2014.pdf
200	Bonheur ASA	Industrials	http://www.bonheur.no/annual-reports3
201	Cxense ASA	Technology	https://www.cxense.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2014-Annual-Report-Cxense-ASA-1.pdf
202	Data Respons ASA	Technology	http://www.datarespons.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/DAT_AnnualReport_2014_WWW.pdf
203	Det norske oljeselskap ASA	Oil & Gas	http://www.detnor.no/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/DETNOR-Annual-Report-2014.pdf?d3c351
204	DOF ASA	Oil & Gas	http://hugin.info/36/R/1904984/677794.pdf
205	Ekornes ASA	Consumer goods	http://ir.ekornes.com/~/media/Files/Investor%20Relations/AArsrapporter/Annual_Report_2014_Ekornes_ASA.pdf
206	Europris ASA	Consumer services	http://cdn.europris.no/media/convert/pdf/Financial_Statements_2014.pdf
207	Farstad Shipping ASA	Industrials	https://www.farstad.com/prod_images/doc_1173_10.pdf
208	Ganger Rolf ASA	Industrials	http://www.ganger-rolf.com/annual-reports5
209	Grieg Seafood ASA	Consumer goods	http://grieg14.digirapport.no/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/GSF-2014-ENG-FINAL1.pdf
210	Havyard Group ASA	Industrials	http://www.havyard.com/userfiles/uploads/documents/pdf/havyard_aarsrapp_2014_web.pdf
211	Hexagon Composites ASA	Industrials	http://hugin.info/132600/R/1906948/680928.pdf
212	Hafslund ASA	Utilities	https://hafnohafslundno.blob.core.windows.net/files/english/IR/reports/annual/2014/Hafslund_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
213	Itera ASA	Technology	http://www.itera.no/Documents/Annual%20reports/Itera_%C3%A5rsrapport_2014_web.pdf
214	Kitron ASA	Technology	http://www.kitron.com/Global/Reports%20and%20Presentations/Annual%20Report%202014%20Eng-web.pdf
215	Kongsberg Gruppen ASA	Industrials	http://www.kongsberg.com/en/kog/investorrelations/reportsandpresentations/
216	Medi-Stim ASA	Health care	http://medistim.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/annual-report-2014.pdf
217	Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA	Consumer services	http://www.norwegian.com/globalassets/ip/documents/about-us/company/investor-relations/reports-and-presentations/annual-reports/norwegian-annual-report-2014-printer-friendly.pdf
218	Norsk Hydro ASA	Basic materials	http://www.hydro.com/upload/Annual_reporting/annual_2014/downloadcenter/Reports/01_annual_report_2014.pdf
219	Nordic Semiconductor ASA	Technology	http://www.nordicsemi.com/eng/Investors/Annual-Reports
220	Norske Skogindustrier ASA	Basic materials	http://www.norskeskog.com/Investors/Reports.aspx

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
221	Ocean Yield ASA	Industrials	https://www.oceanyield.no/Investor-Relations/Reports-and-Presentations
222	Opera Software ASA	Technology	http://www.operasoftware.com/content/download/6593/221344/version/2/file/07545c25e8bea3634617e0b5ba24abbd40ddc93a__009790d8d5d33c07606cf712a2b62286.pdf
223	Orkla ASA	Consumer goods	http://www.orkla.com/content/download/97335/18742293/version/4/file/Orkla+Annual+Report+2014.pdf
224	Reach Subsea ASA	Industrials	http://reachsubsea.no/content/uploads/2015/05/REA-15-0008-Annual-report-english-11.pdf
225	RenoNorden ASA	Industrials	http://renonorden.com/wp-content/themes/renonorden/new_iframes/Annual-Report-RenoNorden-2014.pdf
226	Schibsted ASA	Consumer services	http://hugin.info/131/R/1911430/682298.pdf
DENMARK			
227	Carlsberg	Consumer goods	http://www.carlsberggroup.com/investor/downloadcentre/Documents/Annual%20Report/Carlsberg_AS_Annual_Report_2014_WEB.pdf
228	Coloplast	Health care	http://www.coloplast.com/Documents/Investor%20Relations/Annual%20reports/GB/Annual%20report%202014-15.pdf
229	DFDS	Industrials	http://www.dfdsgroup.com/Investors/Reports/Documents/DFDS-Annual-Report-2014.pdf
230	Genmab	Health care	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-KPIBN/1911354300x0x813003/105A6114-BCDE-4092-BF82-0B2F6B5FE82D/06_GENMAB_AR14_020315.pdf
231	Lundbeck	Health care	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-GGC00/1911693460x0x807233/50A52834-A869-4987-B6B9-2699644837C6/Lundbeck_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
232	Pandora	Consumer goods	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4ZFRFB/1912000649x0x809600/618EF2DE-5930-45B0-807A-5A43679D1152/PANDORA_ANNUAL_REPORT_2014_UK.pdf
233	Royal UNIBREW	Consumer goods	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4U3P72/1912474392x0x814973/AD48E500-00D0-4F64-BDB1-53686FE2CE89/RU_AR14_UK_PRINT_final.pdf
234	TDC	Telecommunications	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4C7P5P/1912370445x0x807789/D70A09A9-7428-4836-B315-204718D8A7CD/Annual_Report_2014.pdf
235	Vestas Wind Systems	Oil & Gas	https://www.vestas.com/~/media/vestas/investor/investor%20pdf/financial%20reports/2014/ar/150211_annual%20report%202014.pdf
236	Ambu	Health care	http://www.ambu.com/corp/investor_relations/financial_reports.aspx
237	Bang & Olufsen	Consumer goods	http://az498215.vo.msecnd.net/static/files/annual_reports/BO_AR14-15_UK.pdf
238	IC Group	Consumer goods	http://www.icgroup.net/wp-content/files_b1/8ad423_icg_uk_annual_report_14-15_02_1_.09.2015.pdf
239	NNIT	Technology	http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/25/253721/financial/annual_reports/NNIT_AR2014.pdf
240	Zealand Pharma	Health care	http://www.zealandpharma.com/investors/financials-new/annual-reports
241	BioPorto	Health care	http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/BioPorto/Annualreport2014/
242	Dantherm	Industrials	http://4f34fbade905fca05f7b-7d06123a86513f16002fcfe0024c545a.r42.cf3.rackcdn.com/media/2260725/ar_2014_eng.pdf
243	Exiqon	Health care	http://www.exiqon.com/investor/financials
244	FirstFarms	Consumer goods	http://www.firstfarms.com/investor-relations/financial-information/annual-accounts/
245	Greentech Energy Systems	Utilities	http://greentech.dk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/GT_AR_2014_LINK.pdf
246	Monb.& Thor.	Industrials	http://www.monthor.com/en/news/2014_02_26_3_uk/$file/Announcement_3_UK.pdf
247	NeuroSearch	Health care	http://neurosearch.com/Default.aspx?ID=8158
248	Nordic Shipholding	Oil & Gas	http://www.nordicshipholding.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=212873&p=irol-reportsenglish

APPENDIX 3 (continued)

No.	Company	Sector	Source of annual report
249	North Media	Consumer services	http://www.northmedia.dk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Annual_Report_2014.pdf
250	NunaMinerals	Basic materials	http://nunaminerals.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Regnskaber/NunaMinerals_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
251	Roblon	Industrials	http://www.roblon.com/download/aarsrapporter/roblon_ar15_uk_final_14-01.pdf
252	RTX	Technology	http://www.rtx.dk/Financial_Reports-2522.aspx
253	Scandinavian Brake Systems	Consumer goods	http://uk.sbs.dk/media/75262/sbs_annual_report_2014.pdf
254	Santa Fe Group	Industrials	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4AIUSN/1922392762x0x812513/4D51637B-8079-4C75-B98B-F0EC2FAA740D/EAC_AR14_UK_WEB_navi.pdf
255	SP Group	Basic materials	http://www.sp-medical.com/media/4072/en-%C3%A5rsrapport-2014.pdf
256	Topsil Semiconductor Materials	Technology	http://www.topsil.com/media/163463/topsil_ar14_uk_web.pdf
257	Scandinavian Tobacco Group	Consumer goods	http://investor.st-group.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=254295&p=irol-reportsAnnual
258	D/S Norden	Industrials	http://www.ds-norden.com/public/dokumenter/reports/AR2014/NORDENannualreport2014.pdf
259	Solar	Industrials	http://www.solar.eu/menu/investor/downloads/2014
260	William Demant Holding	Health care	http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4C7PH1/1922986699x0x812055/17D35BED-F0D6-4C75-B1CC-BCE9E5A57F26/AnnualReport2014.pdf
261	SimCorp	Technology	http://www.simcorp.com/en/about/investor/financial-reports
		ICELAND	
262	Össur	Health care	http://assets.ossur.com/library/35521/
263	Eimskipafélag Íslands	Industrials	http://eimskip.is/investors/Annual%20Report/Eimskip_Annual_Report_2014_lq.pdf
264	Icelandair Group	Consumer services	http://www.icelandairgroup.is/servlet/file/store653/item786131/version1/Annual%20Report%202014%20Icelandair%20Group.pdf
265	Marel	Industrials	http://ar2014.marel.com/Media/marel-annual-report-2014-in-a-pdf.pdf?ind=corporate
266	N1	Consumer services	https://www.n1.is/media/9988/financial_statement_n1_31_12_2014.pdf
267	Nýherji	Technology	http://www.nyherji.is/servlet/file/store718/item92841/version1/N%C3%BDherji%20%C3%A1rsr%2031%2012%202014%20enskur.pdf
268	Fjarskipti	Telecommunications	http://www.vodafone.com/content/annualreport/annual_report14/downloads/full_annual_report_2014.pdf

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with NASDAQ OMX Nordic (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e), Oslo Børs, Oslo Axess (2016).

APPENDIX 4. THE COMPARISON OF BALTIC AND SCANDINAVIAN STOCK EXCHANGES' CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES

Country	Corporate governance disclosure requirements
Lithuania	· The company's development strategy and objectives by clearly declaring how the company intends to meet the interests of its shareholders and optimize shareholder value · A company should make a public statement of the company's remuneration policy which should be clear and easily understandable · The financial and operating results of the company · Company objectives · Persons holding by the right of ownership or in control of a block of shares in the company · Members of the company's supervisory and management bodies, chief executive officer of the company and their remuneration · Material foreseeable risk factors · Transactions between the company and connected persons, as well as transactions concluded outside the course of the company's regular operations · Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders · Governance structures and strategy · The level of fees paid to the firm of auditors for non-audit services rendered to the company
Latvia	· On every board member the following information shall be published: name, surname, year of birth, education, office term, position, description of the last three year's professional experience, number of the issuer's or its parent companies/subsidiaries shares owned by the member, information on positions in other capital companies · The information disclosed by the issuer has to provide a view on the economic activity of the issuer and its financial results · Information as to the application of the remuneration policy to board and council members in the previous financial year
Estonia	· General strategy directions of the issuer as approved by supervisory board · The issuer shall disclose the business name, location, and size of the holding, area of activity, amount of share capital, and net profit or loss during the previous financial year of this company · Membership of the management board and supervisory board · Information regarding the auditor · The management board and the supervisory board shall describe the management practices of the issuer including their compliance with these corporate governance recommendations in the annual report presented to general meeting
Finland	· Information on compliance with the code, if the company has departed from an individual recommendation, information on this as well as the explanation for the departure · A description of the body that is responsible for the duties of the audit committee · Information on the managing directors and his or her duties, the name, year of birth and education of the managing director is presented in addition to information on his or her duties · A description of the composition and operations of the supervisory board, where applicable · The description of the main features of the internal control and risk management systems in relation to the financial reporting process outlines the manner in which the company's internal control and risk management function is organized in order to ensure that the financial reports disclosed to the public by the company give essentially correct information about the company finances · The description of the composition and operations of the board and the board committees shall contain the following information: composition of the board of directors as well as the names, years of birth, education and main occupation of the directors, number of board meetings and the attendance of the members at the meetings, special order of appointment of directors, if applicable, board members who are independent of the company and significant shareholders, disclosure of the main contents of the board's charter · Committees appointed by the board, if any: composition of the committees, number of committee meetings during the previous financial period and the attendance of the committee members at the meetings, disclosure of the main contents of the charter defined for the committee by the board · The description of the composition and operations of a supervisory board, where there is one, shall contain the corresponding information as given on the board, for applicable parts

APPENDIX 4 (continued)

Country	Corporate governance disclosure requirements
	· The company shall report the following biographical details and information on the holdings of directors: name, year of birth, education, main occupation, primary working experience, date of commencement of board membership, key positions of trust, shares and share-based rights of the director and corporations over which he or she exercises control in the company and in companies belonging to the same group as the company · The company shall disclose the organization of the management. If the company has a management team, the company shall disclose the composition and duties of the management team as well as the areas of responsibility of its members · The company shall disclose the remuneration and other financial benefits of the directors for the financial period. The company shall disclose any financial benefits of the chairman of the board and the directors pertaining to their employment relationship or service contract, if applicable · The company shall disclose the shares and share-based rights received by a director as remuneration during the financial period · The company shall disclose the major risks and uncertainties that the board is aware of and the principles along which risk management is organized · The company shall disclose the manner in which the internal audit function of the company is organized
Sweden	· Corporate governance functions in the company and how the company applies the Swedish Corporate Governance Code · The company is to state clearly which code rules it has not complied with, explain the reasons for each case of non-compliance and describe the solution it has adopted instead · The composition of the company's nomination committee. If any member of the committee has been appointed by a particular owner, the name of this owner is also to be stated · The information on each member of the board · The division of work among members of the board and how the work of the board was conducted during the most recent financial year, including the number of board meetings held and each member's attendance at board meetings · The composition, tasks and decision-making authority of any board committees, and each member's attendance at the respective committee's meetings · For the chief executive officer: age, principal education and work experience, significant professional commitments outside the company, and holdings of shares and other financial instruments in the company or similar holdings by related natural or legal persons, as well as shareholdings and part ownership in enterprises with which the company has significant business relations · Any infringement of the stock exchange rules applicable to the company, or any breach of good practice on the securities market reported by the relevant exchange's disciplinary committee or the Swedish Securities Council during the most recent financial year
Norway	· Company's basic corporate values · Company's ethical guidelines and guidelines for corporate social responsibility · Company's business activities · Company's objectives and principal strategies · Information on the membership of the committees · The expertise of the members of the board of directors, and information on their record of attendance at board meetings · Identification of members which are considered to be independent · Key information on members of the board of directors such as their expertise and independence and their record of attendance at board meetings · Information on individual members should include details of their age, education and work experience, and state how long they have been a member of the company's board · Information on any additional work a member has carried out for the company, and on any material appointments or assignments with other companies and/or organizations · Share ownership by members of the board of directors · Details of any board committees appointed · Exposure to risk and its internal control arrangements · Company's internal control and risk management systems · Details of all elements of the remuneration and benefits of each member of the board of directors

APPENDIX 4 (continued)

Country	Corporate governance disclosure requirements
	· All aspects of the individual remuneration of the chief executive and other executive personnel · Information on company's major value drivers and risk factors · The remuneration paid to the auditor, including details of the fee paid for audit work and any fees paid for other specific assignments
Denmark	· Information about the members of the board of directors: the position of the relevant person, the age and gender of the relevant person, whether the member is considered independent, the date of appointment to the board of directors of the member, expiry of the current election period, other executive functions, demanding organizational tasks, the number of shares, options, warrants and similar in the company, and other group companies · The terms of reference of the board committees, the most important activities of the committees during the year, and the number of meetings held by each committee, the names of the members of each committee, including the chairmen of the committees, as well as information on which members are independent members and which members have special qualifications · The total remuneration granted to each member of the board of directors and the executive board by the company and other companies in the group, including information on the most important contents of retention and retirement / resignation schemes, be disclosed in the annual report and that the linkage with the remuneration policy be explained · Additional financial and non-financial information, if deemed necessary or relevant in relation to the information needs of the recipients
Iceland	· The following information on directors must be included in the governance statement: date of birth, education, chief occupation and professional experience, date of first election to the board, other commissions of trust, e.g. membership on boards of other companies, shares in the company, whether direct ownership or through associated parties, connections with principal clients and competitors of the company and large shareholders in the company · The most important risk factors the company has to address · The main aspects of the company's internal controls and risk management must be described in its governance statement · The following information on the CEO must be published in the company's corporate governance statement: name, date of birth, education, chief occupation and professional experience, date of appointment, other commissions of trust, e.g. membership on boards of other companies, shares in the company, whether direct ownership or through associated parties, option agreements with the company, connections with principal clients and competitors of the company and significant shareholders in the company · The establishment and appointment of committees · Remuneration policy, the terms pertaining to individual managers and directors of the company must be made known, including wages, earned pension payments, other payments and benefits, as well as any changes to terms between years · References to the rules on corporate governance that the company follows or is obliged to follow pursuant to law and where such rules can be accessed by the public · Whether the company departs from the rules or applies none of their provisions. The reason for departure must be stated, as must the measures used instead · Reference to any other rules or guidelines that have been followed and that specifically apply to the type of business that the company is involved in · A description of the main aspects of internal controls and the company's risk management · The company's values, code of ethics and social responsibility policy · Description of the composition and activities of the board, management and sub-committees of the board · Arrangement of the appointment of sub-committee members · Information on the number of board meetings and sub-committee meetings as well as their attendance · Where written rules of procedure for the board and its sub-committees may be accessed · Information on board directors · Information on which directors are independent of the company and major shareholders · Principal aspects in the board's performance assessment · Information on the company's CEO and a description of his main duties · Arrangement of communications between shareholders and the board

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with NCGB (2014), SCGB (2015), Iceland Chamber of Commerce (2015), Securities Market Association (2015), Committee on Corporate Governance (2014), NASDAQ OMX Riga (2010), Financial Supervision Authority (2006), NASDAQ OMX Vilnius (2010).

APPENDIX 5. THE CODING SHEET ON DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

No.	Disclosure item	Score		
	I. The business strategy and policies			
1.	The nature of company's business activities	0	1	2
2.	Clear objectives and strategies for its business	0	1	2
3.	The company's basic corporate values and ethical guidelines	0	1	2
4.	Corporate governance structures and strategy, practices and policies	0	1	2
5.	Information on compliance with corporate governance code	0	1	2
6.	The existence of an enterprise code of ethics and any governance structure put in place to support that code of ethics	0	1	2
7.	Guidelines for corporate social responsibility (policies and performance relating to business ethics, the environment and, where material to the company, social issues, human rights, and other public policy commitments)	0	1	2
8.	Key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially affect the performance of the company or that may have significant impacts upon them	0	1	2
9.	The financial and operating results of the company (balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, the cash flow statement, and notes to the financial statements)	0	1	2
10.	Dividend policy	0	1	2
11.	Related party transactions and the terms of such transactions; the nature of the relationship and the nature and amount of transaction	0	1	2
12.	Ownership structure (significant shareholders) of the enterprise and their rights, all of the company's classes and series of shares	0	1	2
13.	Procedures in place to protect the interests of minority shareholders	0	1	2
	II. Board of Directors			
14.	Composition of board of directors and the selection process	0	1	2
15.	The structure, role, duties, responsibilities, functions, and most important tasks of the board	0	1	2
16.	The number of board meetings held during the financial period and the attendance of the directors at the board meetings	0	1	2
17.	Executive and non-executive directors	0	1	2
18.	Identification of the members who are independent	0	1	2
19.	Information on individual members should include details on their name, age (or year of birth), education and work experience, and state how long they have been a member of the company's board or when the person was first elected to the board, expiry of the current election period for board members	0	1	2
20.	Holding of shares and other financial instruments hold in the company and other companies by members of the board of directors and membership on boards of other companies	0	1	2
21.	Chairman of the board of directors	0	1	2
22.	Potential conflicts of interest	0	1	2
23.	Information on whether the board has a performance evaluation process in place, either for the board as a whole or for individual members	0	1	2
24.	Annual general meeting	0	1	2
25.	Description of the composition and operations of the supervisory board, where applicable	0	1	2
	III. Board Committees			
	Nomination committee			
26.	Members and the composition of the committee	0	1	2
27.	Duties and tasks of the committee, role of the committee in the company	0	1	2
28.	Chairman of the committee	0	1	2
29.	The term of office for which members are appointed	0	1	2

APPENDIX 5 (continued)

No.	Disclosure item	Score		
30.	Information on each candidate's competence, capacity, and independence. Each individual's age, education, and business experience, assignments for other companies and organizations	0	1	2
31.	The number of committee meetings held during the financial period and the attendance of committee members at the meetings	0	1	2
	Audit committee			
32.	Members and the composition of the committee	0	1	2
33.	Duties and tasks of the committee, role of the committee in the company	0	1	2
34.	Chairman of the committee	0	1	2
35.	The term of office for which members are appointed	0	1	2
36.	Information on each candidate's competence, capacity, and independence. Each individual's age, education, and business experience, assignments for other companies and organizations	0	1	2
37.	The number of committee meetings held during the financial period and the attendance of committee members at the meetings	0	1	2
	Remuneration committee			
38.	Members and the composition of the committee	0	1	2
39.	Duties and tasks of the committee, role of the committee in the company	0	1	2
40.	Chairman of the committee	0	1	2
41.	The term of office for which members are appointed	0	1	2
42.	Information on each candidate's competence, capacity, and independence. Each individual's age, education, and business experience, assignments for other companies and organizations	0	1	2
43.	The number of committee meetings held during the financial period and the attendance of committee members at the meetings	0	1	2
	Other committees			
44.	Description of the composition and operations of the other committees, where applicable	0	1	2
	IV. Risk management and internal control			
45.	Exposure to risk	0	1	2
46.	The most important risk factors, risks and uncertainties the company has to address	0	1	2
47.	Risk management objectives, systems, and activities	0	1	2
48.	Description of the main elements of the company's systems for internal control and risk management	0	1	2
49.	The manner in which the internal audit function of the company is organized – the organization of the internal audit function and the central principles applied to internal audits	0	1	2
	V. External auditor			
50.	Independence of external auditor	0	1	2
51.	Audit partner rotation, the duration of the current auditor	0	1	2
52.	Information on remuneration paid to the auditor and the breakdown of this remuneration between audit and other services	0	1	2
53.	Services other than the audit provided by the auditor	0	1	2
54.	The audit statement (report)	0	1	2
	VI. Chief Executive Officer			
55.	Age, principal education and work experience (Biographical details)	0	1	2
56.	Significant professional commitments outside the company	0	1	2
57.	Holdings of shares and other financial instruments in the company and other companies	0	1	2
	VII. Management team and other executives			

APPENDIX 5 (continued)

No.	Disclosure item	Score		
58.	The composition and duties of the management team and the areas of responsibilities of its members	0	1	2
59.	The biographical details and information on the holdings of each member of the management team	0	1	2
60.	If the company does not have a management team – data on other executives	0	1	2
	VIII. Remuneration of the board of directors and executive personnel			
61.	Remuneration policy and principles	0	1	2
62.	Details of all elements of the remuneration and other financial benefits of board of directors and other executive personnel	0	1	2
		Maximum: 124		

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with NCGB (2014), SCGB (2015), Iceland Chamber of Commerce (2015), Securities Market Association (2015), Committee on Corporate Governance (2014), NASDAQ OMX Riga (2010), Financial Supervision Authority (2006), NASDAQ OMX Vilnius (2010), ICGN (2014), United Nations (2006, 2011), OECD (2015).

APPENDIX 6. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE INDEX

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																														
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
1	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
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3	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
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20	1	2	0	2	2	0	0	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
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APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																															
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
36	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
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67	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
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APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																															
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
72	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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74	1	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
75	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	0	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
76	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
77	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
78	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
79	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
80	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
81	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	1
82	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
83	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
84	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
85	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2
86	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
87	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
88	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
89	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
90	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
91	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
92	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
93	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2
94	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
95	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
96	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
97	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
98	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
99	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
100	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
101	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
102	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
103	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
104	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
105	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
106	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
107	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																														
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
108	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
109	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
110	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
111	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
112	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
113	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
114	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
115	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
116	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
117	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
118	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
119	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
120	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
121	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
122	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
123	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
124	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
125	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
126	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
127	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
128	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
129	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
130	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
131	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
132	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
133	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
134	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
135	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
136	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
137	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
138	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
139	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
140	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
141	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
142	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
143	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	2

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																														
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
144	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
145	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
146	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2
147	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
148	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
149	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
150	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
151	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
152	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
153	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
154	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
155	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
156	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
157	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2
158	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
159	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
160	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
161	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
162	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
163	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
164	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	1
165	2	1	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
166	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
167	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
168	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
169	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
170	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
171	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
172	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
173	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
174	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
175	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
176	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
177	2	1	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
178	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
179	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																														
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
180	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
181	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
182	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
183	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
184	2	1	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
185	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
186	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
187	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
188	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
189	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
190	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
191	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
192	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
193	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
194	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2
195	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
196	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
197	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
198	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
199	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
200	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
201	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
202	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
203	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
204	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
205	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
206	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
207	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
208	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
209	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
210	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
211	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
212	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
213	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
214	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
215	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																															
	I													II													III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
216	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
217	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
218	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
219	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
220	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
221	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
222	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
223	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
224	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	1
225	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
226	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
227	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
228	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
229	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
230	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
231	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
232	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
233	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
234	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
235	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
236	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
237	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
238	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
239	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
240	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
241	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
242	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
243	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
244	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
245	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
246	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
247	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
248	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
249	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
250	1	1	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
251	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 1-32)																														
	I													II												III						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
252	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
253	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
254	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
255	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
256	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
257	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	2
258	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
259	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
260	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
261	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
262	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
263	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
264	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
265	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
266	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	1	2	0	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
267	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
268	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Reference. Compiled by author.

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	46	0,37
2	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	54	0,44
3	2	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	69	0,56
4	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	57	0,46
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	37	0,30
6	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	52	0,42
7	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	40	0,32
8	1	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	69	0,56
9	2	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	73	0,59
10	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	79	0,64
11	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	55	0,44
12	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	63	0,51

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
13	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	51	0,41
14	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	42	0,34
15	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	67	0,54
16	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	51	0,41
17	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	74	0,60
18	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	60	0,48
19	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	72	0,58
20	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	63	0,51
21	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	46	0,37
22	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	55	0,44
23	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	28	0,23
24	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	29	0,23
25	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	27	0,22
26	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	35	0,28
27	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	24	0,19
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	20	0,16
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	22	0,18
30	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	33	0,27
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	33	0,27
32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	28	0,23
33	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	54	0,44
34	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	26	0,21
35	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	38	0,31
36	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	26	0,21
37	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	23	0,19
38	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	22	0,18
39	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	22	0,18
40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	22	0,18
41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	33	0,27
42	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	27	0,22
43	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	68	0,55
44	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	65	0,52
45	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	64	0,52
46	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	67	0,54

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																													Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
47	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	64	0,52
48	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	53	0,43
49	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	47	0,38
50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	40	0,32
51	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	44	0,35
52	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	59	0,48
53	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	54	0,44
54	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	68	0,55
55	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
56	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
57	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	99	0,80
58	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	112	0,90
59	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	113	0,91
60	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
61	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	114	0,92
62	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	96	0,77
63	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	91	0,73
64	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
65	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	96	0,77
66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	77	0,62
67	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	104	0,84
68	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	96	0,77
69	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	92	0,74
70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	61	0,49
71	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	81	0,65
72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	63	0,51
73	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
74	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	96	0,77
75	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	93	0,75
76	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	95	0,77
77	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	69	0,56
78	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	66	0,53
79	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	73	0,59
80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	69	0,56

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
81	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	81	0,65
82	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	97	0,78
83	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	72	0,58
84	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
85	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	89	0,72
86	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
87	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	110	0,89
88	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	110	0,89
89	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	110	0,89
90	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
91	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	117	0,94
92	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	114	0,92
93	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	100	0,81
94	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	102	0,82
95	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	74	0,60
96	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
97	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
98	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
99	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	107	0,86
100	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	116	0,94
101	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	104	0,84
102	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
103	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81
104	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	95	0,77
105	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
106	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	114	0,92
107	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	118	0,95
108	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81
109	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	88	0,71
110	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	97	0,78
111	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
112	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	102	0,82
113	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	97	0,78
114	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	101	0,81

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
115	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
116	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
117	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	99	0,80
118	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	86	0,69
119	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
120	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	114	0,92
121	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	114	0,92
122	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	99	0,80
123	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	100	0,81
124	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	102	0,82
125	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
126	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
127	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	116	0,94
128	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	85	0,69
129	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	99	0,80
130	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
131	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	103	0,83
132	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
133	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	100	0,81
134	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81
135	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	95	0,77
136	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	102	0,82
137	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	103	0,83
138	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
139	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
140	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	103	0,83
141	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	103	0,83
142	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	94	0,76
143	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	104	0,84
144	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	89	0,72
145	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
146	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
147	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	92	0,74
148	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
149	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
150	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
151	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	95	0,77
152	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	100	0,81
153	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	99	0,80
154	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	96	0,77
155	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	102	0,82
156	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
157	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	100	0,81
158	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
159	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	95	0,77
160	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	108	0,87
161	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	98	0,79
162	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	103	0,83
163	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
164	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	81	0,65
165	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	75	0,60
166	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	98	0,79
167	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	105	0,85
168	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	93	0,75
169	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	91	0,73
170	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
171	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
172	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	81	0,65
173	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	97	0,78
174	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	97	0,78
175	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	100	0,81
176	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	91	0,73
177	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	91	0,73
178	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	89	0,72
179	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	102	0,82
180	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	92	0,74
181	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	87	0,70
182	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	100	0,81

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
183	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	98	0,79
184	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	79	0,64
185	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	73	0,59
186	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	102	0,82
187	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	104	0,84
188	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
189	1	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	98	0,79
190	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	100	0,81
191	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	99	0,80
192	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
193	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	103	0,83
194	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
195	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	98	0,79
196	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	104	0,84
197	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	91	0,73
198	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	99	0,80
199	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	98	0,79
200	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	96	0,77
201	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	89	0,72
202	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	94	0,76
203	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
204	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	103	0,83
205	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
206	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
207	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	101	0,81
208	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	96	0,77
209	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	99	0,80
210	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	106	0,85
211	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
212	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	95	0,77
213	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	102	0,82
214	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
215	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
216	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	78	0,63

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
217	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	98	0,79
218	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
219	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
220	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	101	0,81
221	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	98	0,79
222	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
223	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
224	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	86	0,69
225	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	105	0,85
226	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
227	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	109	0,88
228	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	72	0,58
229	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	98	0,79
230	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	99	0,80
231	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	95	0,77
232	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
233	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	86	0,69
234	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	102	0,82
235	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	107	0,86
236	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	99	0,80
237	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	111	0,90
238	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81
239	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	78	0,63
240	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	89	0,72
241	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	110	0,89
242	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	73	0,59
243	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	101	0,81
244	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	75	0,60
245	2	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	82	0,66
246	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	71	0,57
247	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	58	0,47
248	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	76	0,61
249	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	92	0,74
250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	61	0,49

APPENDIX 6 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Item number in the corporate governance disclosure list (Items 33-62)																														Total score	CGDI
	III												IV					V					VI			VII			VIII			
	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62		
251	2	2	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	83	0,67
252	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	68	0,55
253	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	70	0,56
254	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	80	0,65
255	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	84	0,68
256	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	108	0,87
257	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	94	0,76
258	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	100	0,81
259	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	91	0,73
260	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	95	0,77
261	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	94	0,76
262	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	69	0,56
263	1	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	73	0,59
264	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	80	0,65
265	1	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	65	0,52
266	2	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	48	0,39
267	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	43	0,35
268	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	117	0,94

Reference. Compiled by author.

APPENDIX 7. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
1	69737	8,43	0,25	1	1
2	373304	-27,72	0,20	1	1
3	54749	16,50	0,17	1	1
4	72501	4,00	0,25	1	1
5	7650	-28,00	0,00	0	0
6	66461	5,70	0,10	1	1
7	10189	-3,57	0,00	0	1
8	145853	0,60	0,07	0	1
9	32687	4,40	0,38	1	1
10	914637	3,65	0,13	1	1
11	7539	-13,58	0,00	0	1
12	528577	-18,20	0,13	1	1
13	61699	1,75	0,00	1	1
14	90036	5,53	0,29	1	1
15	125702	-4,87	0,00	1	1
16	31090	-2,33	0,00	1	1
17	275096	13,40	0,33	1	1
18	14581	-1,60	0,00	1	1
19	48492	3,90	0,33	1	1
20	24787	19,88	0,00	1	1
21	25473	4,32	0,00	0	0
22	67166	4,32	0,00	0	1
23	8657	2,97	0,00	0	1
24	24729	-2,82	0,00	0	1
25	11280	-53,40	0,00	1	1
26	139156	-2,42	0,00	1	1
27	18844	-8,79	0,25	0	1
28	1906	1,05	0,00	0	1
29	1669	-5,87	0,00	0	1
30	123497	6,45	0,46	0	1
31	747970	3,72	0,33	1	1
32	7246	3,67	0,50	1	1
33	347431	-6,62	0,07	1	1
34	24964	0,08	0,00	0	1
35	106723	11,50	0,36	1	1
36	31840	-0,01	0,63	0	1
37	5726	-5,22	0,00	0	0
38	39197	1,66	0,00	0	1

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
39	1566	-8,43	0,00	0	0
40	46854	-2,28	0,00	0	0
41	12076	0,98	0,13	1	0
42	1564	9,91	0,00	0	1
43	23115	-5,40	0,40	1	1
44	76595	6,60	0,44	1	1
45	69792	13,80	0,33	1	1
46	249250	5,00	0,33	1	1
47	97458	2,30	0,33	1	1
48	126231	17,70	0,20	1	1
49	40429	-3,00	0,44	1	1
50	67339	11,90	0,29	1	0
51	13329	-11,10	0,00	1	1
52	1685598	4,10	0,00	1	1
53	342907	6,00	0,00	1	1
54	205576	8,70	0,15	1	1
55	2173600	2,55	1,00	1	1
56	1589500	48,65	1,00	1	1
57	4197700	2,58	1,00	1	1
58	3403000	5,55	1,00	1	1
59	6494000	0,92	1,00	1	1
60	1001500	21,10	1,00	1	1
61	12847000	0,70	1,00	1	1
62	1031500	3,39	0,80	1	1
63	2412000	1,91	1,00	1	1
64	921100	-1,12	1,00	1	1
65	256100	6,13	0,57	1	1
66	168781	1,75	0,60	1	0
67	1885100	-4,38	1,00	1	1
68	458300	3,95	1,00	1	1
69	1442100	0,01	1,00	1	1
70	19336	19,32	1,00	1	0
71	1936500	-5,15	0,63	1	0
72	533100	5,74	1,00	1	0
73	290289	0,77	0,50	1	1
74	124838	-1,27	0,67	1	1
75	1272447	5,37	0,27	1	1
76	80393	3,55	1,00	1	1
77	77639	7,03	1,00	1	0

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
78	47635	3,79	0,80	1	0
79	90662	5,33	0,80	1	0
80	8527	10,44	0,75	1	0
81	52646	4,49	1,00	1	0
82	11262	-1,47	0,86	1	1
83	51800	5,41	0,60	1	0
84	21375000	14,79	1,00	1	1
85	2295700	4,17	0,83	1	1
86	21063000	5,56	0,78	1	1
87	2059165460	-5,62	0,64	1	1
88	4531880	-8,48	0,88	1	1
89	11834330	21,06	0,67	1	1
90	4383280	6,59	0,67	1	1
91	29927260	5,73	0,67	1	1
92	3645331	-4,31	0,57	1	1
93	199760	19,27	0,80	1	1
94	326370	-0,84	1,00	1	1
95	594619680	-2,46	0,50	1	1
96	1376320	7,10	0,38	1	1
97	6136460	5,32	0,50	1	1
98	6624181	6,30	0,89	1	1
99	1066120	11,39	0,20	1	1
100	242737	24,44	0,33	1	1
101	551383	15,37	0,83	1	1
102	2827990	5,06	0,67	1	1
103	4825150	4,33	0,50	1	1
104	2097590	-4,43	0,80	1	1
105	2330240	2,63	0,75	1	1
106	9425680	2,62	0,50	1	1
107	32291380	3,79	0,47	1	1
108	8315670	26,42	0,58	1	1
109	4007740	2,49	0,27	1	0
110	801240	14,39	0,29	1	1
111	7967740	4,29	0,36	1	1
112	889570	8,69	0,63	1	1
113	817850	7,67	0,42	1	1
114	1432970	6,99	0,50	1	1
115	7162320	0,62	0,78	1	1
116	1554410	8,29	0,71	1	1

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
117	88441	30,25	0,57	1	1
118	864050	-0,13	0,25	1	0
119	3251160	3,95	0,42	1	1
120	11695090	5,64	0,42	1	1
121	17020960	4,57	0,56	1	1
122	4519218	5,04	0,27	1	1
123	700782	-4,20	0,50	1	1
124	9869970	-1,55	0,42	1	1
125	650881	9,20	0,40	1	1
126	1823030	15,85	0,70	1	1
127	42118560	0,58	0,58	1	1
128	102712	6,12	0,83	1	1
129	765050	5,54	0,42	1	1
130	207339	4,48	0,67	1	1
131	1377420	-0,06	0,18	1	1
132	1095820	2,43	0,57	1	1
133	411477	12,27	0,60	1	1
134	36759030	15,84	0,38	1	1
135	227260	11,67	1,00	1	1
136	476080	7,37	0,44	1	1
137	422827	3,25	0,57	1	1
138	982800	1,13	0,63	1	1
139	388487	7,39	0,43	1	1
140	490600	7,15	0,57	1	1
141	530772	4,71	0,50	1	1
142	322960	3,64	0,78	1	1
143	91558	7,58	1,00	1	1
144	333080	6,97	0,67	1	1
145	11626	41,89	0,83	1	1
146	315755	3,88	0,71	1	1
147	231660	9,64	1,00	1	1
148	592240	2,36	0,57	1	1
149	1179500	0,65	0,86	1	1
150	240228	51,87	0,50	1	1
151	56602590	-22,83	0,50	1	1
152	699139	5,36	0,50	1	1
153	134847	-4,62	0,67	1	1
154	260469	0,23	0,75	1	1
155	427509000	3,31	0,44	1	1

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
156	3329260	3,16	0,64	1	1
157	340483	1,81	0,57	1	1
158	413582	6,61	0,38	1	1
159	515922	6,61	0,57	1	0
160	764720	2,86	0,71	1	1
161	81950	-6,83	0,57	1	1
162	303680	2,26	0,71	1	1
163	196917	1,67	0,56	1	1
164	38492	4,34	0,60	1	0
165	18354	-37,67	0,40	1	0
166	243760	-3,29	0,86	1	1
167	164612	4,19	0,71	1	1
168	8958	-23,55	0,75	1	1
169	215884	-7,64	0,57	1	1
170	67057	10,36	1,00	1	1
171	75006	8,23	0,80	1	1
172	129800	5,25	0,43	1	0
173	16191	4,63	0,60	0	1
174	6968	-25,99	0,71	1	1
175	41294	11,24	0,80	1	1
176	8551	-28,40	0,86	1	1
177	235115	-7,36	0,86	1	1
178	39569	3,41	0,83	1	0
179	183106	7,22	0,86	1	1
180	68587	6,65	0,83	1	0
181	74154	18,66	1,00	1	1
182	67425	4,01	0,71	1	1
183	14439	-16,86	0,57	0	1
184	15224	2,96	0,50	1	1
185	69049	2,07	0,29	1	0
186	169498	3,89	1,00	1	1
187	597080	8,89	0,25	1	1
188	372852	-10,07	0,67	1	1
189	2687300	10,20	0,38	1	1
190	238862	5,07	0,50	1	1
191	3013010	4,75	0,38	1	1
192	99420	6,03	0,38	1	1
193	32828	2,12	1,00	1	1
194	34156	3,45	0,33	1	1

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
195	1602534	-5,54	0,50	1	1
196	1388607	3,39	0,29	1	1
197	319110	12,20	0,40	1	0
198	2567840	4,29	0,57	1	1
199	450181	18,69	0,67	0	1
200	4555709	1,20	0,60	1	1
201	20737	-35,14	0,40	0	1
202	50633	8,86	0,33	1	1
203	4792091	-1,73	0,90	1	1
204	980157	2,45	0,80	1	1
205	262320	6,71	0,38	1	1
206	414469	3,96	0,67	1	1
207	450333	15,42	0,57	1	1
208	960503	0,06	0,60	1	1
209	554639	2,74	0,60	1	1
210	191002	1,73	0,57	0	1
211	129758	13,59	0,80	1	1
212	2883320	3,83	0,50	1	1
213	21847	9,59	0,67	1	1
214	126719	2,11	0,50	1	1
215	2230030	4,34	0,63	1	1
216	22384	15,35	0,20	0	0
217	1623902	2,18	0,71	1	1
218	13890030	0,97	0,60	1	1
219	116178	14,21	0,75	1	1
220	1690260	-5,77	0,38	1	1
221	1611701	5,57	0,80	1	1
222	474370	11,31	0,63	1	1
223	5512320	4,36	0,42	1	1
224	28926	9,44	0,60	1	0
225	246401	1,89	0,40	1	1
226	1809610	6,30	0,60	1	1
227	17807790	4,88	0,33	1	1
228	1406210	8,31	0,36	1	1
229	1592351	3,54	0,33	1	1
230	372669	10,51	0,67	1	1
231	2340650	13,69	0,44	1	1
232	1372280	29,35	0,70	1	1
233	913099	8,89	0,64	1	1

APPENDIX 7 (continued)

Comp. no. (App. 3)	Company's size (million euros)	Profitability (ROA, %)	Proportion of independent directors	Big audit firm	Audit committee
234	9666930	4,34	0,45	1	1
235	909610	5,60	0,58	1	1
236	293020	6,74	0,56	1	1
237	448370	1,65	0,67	1	1
238	240760	7,56	0,83	1	1
239	166713	16,32	0,50	1	1
240	77578	-10,89	0,50	1	1
241	4841	-34,71	1,00	1	1
242	50374	-7,37	0,29	1	0
243	17896	-2,02	1,00	1	1
244	65760	1,74	1,00	1	0
245	57205	-5,54	0,57	1	1
246	76310	-1,57	0,50	1	1
247	10924	-9,21	0,33	1	0
248	121489	1,72	0,50	1	1
249	115518	2,55	0,25	1	1
250	12309	-64,08	1,00	1	0
251	37366	6,40	0,33	1	1
252	44604	14,25	0,40	1	0
253	78975	10,16	0,50	1	1
254	231920	19,56	1,00	1	1
255	122645	4,22	0,20	1	1
256	82318	-6,63	0,50	1	1
257	1841047	4,52	0,67	1	1
258	1834505	-2,32	0,33	1	1
259	594620	-5,12	0,44	1	1
260	1458470	11,83	0,29	1	1
261	117469	33,49	0,71	1	1
262	603227	8,77	0,40	1	1
263	332040	4,10	0,86	1	1
264	755806	7,83	0,83	1	1
265	851440	1,38	1,00	1	1
266	161811	7,14	0,83	1	1
267	40971	4,18	1,00	1	1
268	155955200	48,77	0,71	1	1

Reference. Compiled by author.

APPENDIX 8. PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

Correlations								
		Size_ln	Profitability	Independence	Audit_firm	Audit_committee	CGDI
Size_ln	Pearson Correlation	1	,217**	,229**	,397**	,289**	,592**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268
Profitability	Pearson Correlation	,217**	1	,129*	,154*	,113	,225**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,035	,011	,065	,000
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268
Independence	Pearson Correlation	,229**	,129*	1	,400**	,039	,542**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,035		,000	,520	,000
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268
Audit_firm	Pearson Correlation	,397**	,154*	,400**	1	,109	,510**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,011	,000		,075	,000
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268
Audit_committee	Pearson Correlation	,289**	,113	,039	,109	1	,302**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,065	,520	,075		,000
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268
CGDI	Pearson Correlation	,592**	,225**	,542**	,510**	,302**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	
	N	268	268	268	268	268	268

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Reference. Compiled by author in accordance with data from SPSS statistical program.